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BEYOND MISGUIDED PATERNALISM: 
RESUSCITATING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL 
TREATMENT 
S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy * 
The author focuses on the failure of the courts to provide a rem-
edy for the right to refuse medical treatment. Health care pro-
viders, for a number of reasons, often ignore patient requests to 
forgo certain life-extending medical procedures. The courts 
have generally allowed medical professionals complete discre-
tion in deciding whether to honor patients' requests. When pa-
tients or their estates sue health care providers for violation of 
the right to refuse treatment, courts have refused to award 
damages. By failing to provide a remedy, the courts effectively 
make the right a meaningless one. While acknowledging the 
importance of physician autonomy, the author argues that the 
courts' one-sided approach to this dilemma is unsound. To im-
plement the right, the author advocates and describes a new 
approach under which courts would consider not only the spe-
cial context in which this issue generally arises but also the im-
portant autonomy interests inherent in the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The common law has long recognized an individual's right to 
self-determination over her own body, free from interference by oth-
ers. I This right of self-determination expresses the principles, or 
value choice, of personal autonomy. It includes decisions such as 
those relating to the medical care that we choose to receive. 
Today new biomedical technologies such as respirators, cardiac 
pacemakers, and kidney dialysis units have greatly increased medi-
cine's capacity to extend human life.2 Although in many cases these 
technologies extend life, often they only extend the process of dying.3 
Modern medicine frequently permits individuals to live with what 
were previously fatal diseases, but it often cannot cure or reverse 
those illnesses entirely.4 Consequently, a person is not restored to a 
1. For a general discussion of the principles of self-determination and 
autonomy, see H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETIDCS 
264 (1986), which states that "[o]ne of the ancient presumptions of English law 
is that individuals should be secure in their bodies against the unauthorized 
touching of others," and Sylvia A Law, Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and 
Ethical Obligations to Patients Seeking Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 279, 285 (1994-1995), which comments that "[p]atients' rights to self-
determination and autonomy in medical decision-making have deep historic 
roots and command broad respect as abstract principles." 
2. According to one historian, "[nlinety percent of the medicine being 
practiced today did not exist in 1950." John Steele Gordon, How America's 
Health Care Fell Ill, AM. HERITAGE, May-June 1992, at 49, 49. 
3. See LIFE CHOICES: A HAsTINGS CENTER INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS 134 
(Joseph H. Howell & William Frederick Sale eds., 1995) (discussing the new ar-
ray of ethical issues that arise from advances in medical technology). Justice 
Brennan noted that: 
The timing of death-once a matter of fate-is now a matter of hu-
man choice. Of the approximately 2 million people who die each year, 
80% die in hospitals and long-term care institutions, perhaps 70% of 
those after a decision to forego life-sustaining treatment has been 
made. Nearly every death involves a decision whether to undertake 
some medical procedure that could prolong the process of dying. 
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 302 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted). 
4. See PRESIDENT'S COMMN FOR THE STUDY OF ETillCAL PROBLEMS IN MED. 
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREAThiENT 3 (1983). The study states: 
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fully functioning life. Unfortunately, many patients who have had 
their lives extended by modern medical advancements find their 
physical and psychological existence to be unsatisfactory.5 Begin-
ning in the early 1900s, some patients attempted to avoid that out-
come by "asserting a right to die a natural death, without undue de-
pendence on medical technology or ... a right to 'die with dignity.",6 
In recent years, a legal consensus has evolved that competent pa-
tients have a near absolute right to refuse medical treatmene This 
right also rests with the legal surrogates of incompetent patients, 
who may decline treatment on the incompetent patients' behalf.8 
The voluntary choice of a competent and informed patient should de-
termine whether or not life-sustaining therapy will be undertaken, 
just as such choices provide the basis for other decisions about medi-
cal treatment. Health care institutions and professionals should try 
to enhance patients' abilities to make decisions on their own behalf 
and to promote understanding of the available treatment options. 
Id. The median life e}.llectancy is now 79 for women and 72 for men. See 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1995, at 86 (115th ed. 1995). 
5. As Jonathan Swift observed, "[e]very Man desires to live long; but no 
Man would be old." JONATHAN SWIFT, Thoughts on Various Subjects, in SATIRES 
AND PERSONAL WRITINGS 406, 414 (William Alfred Eddy ed., 1932). Both public 
opinion polls and scientific studies show that many people prefer not to be 
placed on life-support systems. See James Lindgren, Death by Default, 56 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 197-99 (1993) (reviewing medical opinion polls and dis-
cussing the individual's fear of being placed on life support and losing the abil-
ity to make medical decisions for him or herself). 
6. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (N.J. 1985); see also Judith C. Areen, 
Bioethics and the Law: The Second Stage: Balancing Intelligent Consent and 
Individual Autonomy, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 447, 449-51 (1989) (recognizing that un-
til the 1900s there was no recognition of informed consent). For a history of the 
patient autonomy movement, see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN MEDICINE 389-93 (1982). 
7. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (indicating that competent persons have a 
"constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical 
treatment"); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J. 1976) (recognizing that 
the right to privacy includes the right to refuse medical treatment). Every state 
and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes that enable patients to 
make end-of-life decisions in the form of advance directives. See The New DNR 
Laws: Pros and Cons, CHOICE IN DYING (National" Council for the Right to Die, 
New York, N.Y.), Spring 1993, at 1 (listing and discussing advance directive 
statutes in the various states); see also GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, 
TRAGIC CHOICES 16-17, 56 (1978) (coining the term "tragic choice" to describe 
situations in which a legal system must allocate burdens and benefits involving 
great suffering or death); 2 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE, § 12.25, at 171 
n.135 (2d ed. 1995) (presenting a comprehensive account of practices and laws 
governing the foregoing of life-sustaining treatment and surrogate decision-
making); Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on 
Roe, Casey, and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803, 841 (1995) (discussing 
the policies behind the right to refuse treatment). 
8. See Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1227-28. 
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As the right to refuse treatment gained social acceptance, more 
people chose to exercise that righe It is clear, however, that physi-
cians have not accorded the same respect to the right as has soci-
ety.lO Some evidence suggests that many physicians are keeping pa-
tients alive against their wishes.ll Some physicians are motivated 
to keep patients alive because of liability concerns, the promise of 
new life-sustaining technology, or even financial considerations.12 
As a result, physicians frequently will override patient decisions to 
refuse medical treatment because of a belief that respecting the pa-
tient's request would not be in the patient's or the doctor's best in-
terest.13 
Due to the medical profession'S failure to honor consistently the 
right to refuse medical treatment, a growing number of patients (or 
their estates) have filed lawsuits alleging that patients who received 
unwanted life-sustaining treatment suffered a compensable injury.14 
9. See Robert L. Jayes et al., Do-Nat-Resuscitate Orders in Intensive Care 
Units: Current Practices and Recent Changes, 270 JAMA 2213, 2215 (1993) 
(discussing a recent study showing that, from 1988 to 1990, almost twice as 
many intensive care unit patients had do not resuscitate ("DNR") orders as did 
patients from 1979 to 1982); see also Areen, supra note 6, at 449 (commenting 
that the emergence of a patient's rights movement over the past few decades 
has reduced the traditional autonomy of the medical profession). 
10. See David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-at-Life De-
cisions, 267 JAMA 2101, 2102 (1992) (noting that physicians' values dominate 
end-of-life decision-making although physicians' do a poor job of eliciting pa-
tient values and preferences and are unaware of what the patient really wants); 
see also Susan Gilbert, Study Finds Doctors Refuse Patients'Requests on Death, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at Al (quoting Dr. William Kraus as saying, 
"[although] [p]eople think advance directives are solving the problem ... [w]e 
have very good information that they aren't, that nothing has changed-the 
amount of pain at the end of life, the number of people dying alone attached to 
machines"). 
11. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 1-29 (1984) 
(noting that, historically, medical practitioners treated patients paternalisti-
cally and resisted efforts by courts and patients to increase patient participa-
tion in medical decision-making). 
12. See, e.g., DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN 
AGING SOCIETY 160-64 (1987) (discussing the influence of advanced medical 
technology); Merrijoy Kelner et al., Advance Directives: The Views of Health 
Care Professionals, 148 CANADIAN MED. Ass'N J. 1331, 1335-36 (1993) 
(discussing the reservations that physicians have about advanced directives); 
Tony Smith, Cheap Managed Death, 310 BRIT. MED. J. 744 (1995) (stating that 
doctors have ethical and financial incentives to keep patients alive). 
13. See Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for 
Life-Sustaining Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882, 886 (1991). An advance direc-
tive study tried to discover why living wills are sometimes disregarded by phy-
sicians. See id. at 882-87. Researchers concluded that physicians override ad-
vance directives when they disagree with the patient's choices and feel that the 
undesired treatment is appropriate. See id. 
14. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1530 (D. 
Colo. 1987); McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 524 A.2d 450, 452 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1987); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 507 A.2d 718, 
719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Elbaum v. Grace Plaza, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 
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The majority of these suits have relied on traditional tort theory.I5 
Generally, these suits claim that the patient suffered a diminished 
quality of life after receiving undesired medical treatment, which 
violated a personal autonomy interest.16 
To date, no courts have permitted recovery for violation of the 
right to refuse treatment.17 Many courts have not even permitted 
such causes of action to proceed. IS The reasons for this lack of rem-
edy are complex and varied. Some courts have been willing to 
overlook the harm caused to a person kept alive against his or her 
,vill if the court finds that he or she is not experiencing pain-
especially those patients who never regain consciousness.19 Under-
840, 845-48 (App. Div. 1989); Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 
N.E.2d 225, 226 (Ohio 1996); 1 MEISEL, supra note 7, § 3.4, at 51. 
15. For a discussion of theories advanced in cases seeking damages for 
failure to honor patients' refusal of treatment, see M. Rose Gasner, Financial 
Penalties for Failing to Honor Patient Wishes to Refuse Treatment, 11 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 499, 504-12 (1992), David H. Miller, Right-to-Die Damage Ac-
tions: Developments in the Law, 65 DENV. U. L. REV. 181, 185-97 (1989), and 
Steven 1. Addlestone, Note, Liability for Improper Maintenance of Life Support: 
Balancing Patient and Physician Autonomy, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1255, 1267-73 
(1993). 
16. See, e.g., Elbaum, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 847; Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226. 
17. See Elena N. Cohen, Death and Dying, 1 BioLaw (Univ. Pub. Am.) § 12, 
at R:262 (July 1989) (reporting no significant damages awards have been won 
by patients in the United States). Although no reported cases exist in which 
the court awarded damages for the unwanted imposition of life-sustaining 
treatment, there have been some jury verdicts and settlements in which the 
plaintiff recovered damages. See Gasner, supra note 15, at 504-12 (discussing 
the dismissal and settlement of various cases and contemplating alternative 
theories of recovery which may prove successful in future litigation); Miller, su-
pra note 15, at 197-98 (stating that plaintiffs fair poorly in front of judges). In 
addition, one court has recognized the potential for a cause of action. See Estate 
of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing 
the potential for a battery action when a patient is resuscitated against her 
wishes). Another case awarded an injunction so that the plaintiff could have 
the life-sustaining treatment removed. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. 
Rptr. 297, 307 (Ct. App. 1986) (granting injunction to patient who wished to 
have medical care terminated). 
18. See Gasner, supra note 15, at 504-12 (discussing the failure of plaintiffs 
to recover for violations of their right to refuse treatment); Miller, supra note 
15, at 185 (reviewing the dismal prospects for patients in such damage actions). 
19. These courts focus on the fact that many who are suffering from termi-
nal illnesses may be experiencing little or no pain, or have lost consciousness. 
The courts thus reason that an individual in such a state suffers no harm if he 
or she is kept alive. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 301, 320 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (voicing complaint that the ma-
jority failed to realize the harm to individual autonomy when an individual, 
even one in a persistent vegetative state is kept alive against his or her 
wishes); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT 
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 184, 191 (1993) (arguing that 
an individual can be harmed by being kept alive against his or her will, or, if 
the individual lacks consciousness, against whatever values informed his or her 
active life); JOEL FEINBERG, An Unpromising Approach to the "Right to Die," in 
FREEDOM AND FuLFILLMENT: PHILOSOPIllCAL ESSAYS 260, 278 (1992) (discussing 
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standably, judges are also reluctant to provide a remedy (i.e., award 
damages) because to do so would ostensibly mean that the court fa-
vored death over life.20 To avoid this dilemma, courts have ma-
nipulated tort concepts to validate life-prolonging measures under 
almost any circumstances, even when a competent patient has de-
cided to refuse treatment.21 In so doing, the courts render ineffec-
tive the right to refuse treatment.22 Physicians can sustain life, 
sometimes for months or even years, for people who are near death 
(or horribly diseased), sedated into near oblivion, and connected to 
dozens of machines that do most of the individual's ''living.,,2.3 Un-
derstandably, many ofthese patients have expressed a wish to die. 24 
In addition to thwarting an individual's autonomy, violation of 
the right to die with dignity has other repercussions, including the 
emotional and financial toll on a patient's family and loved ones.25 
Moreover, society has an interest in making sure that people are not 
kept alive against their wishes. Most people think that the way 
they die and their attitude towards death bear crucially on the 
value of their lives.26 As legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin has ob-
the harm to an individual's autonomy rights when his or her last wishes are not 
respected). 
20. See, e.g., Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228 (holding that life is not a com-
pensable injury and refusing to recognize wrongful living as a cause of action). 
21. See, e.g., Addelstone, supra note 15, at 1268-71 (discussing the courts' 
failure to provide a remedy for violation of the right to refuse treatment using 
ordinary tort principles). 
22. See Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal 
Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 735, 735-36 (1992) (arguing that a tight fit be-
tween rights and remedies does not exist for many constitutional rights). Wil-
liam Blackstone recognized that "it is a general and indisputable rule, that 
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at 
law, whenever that right is invaded." 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COJ\Il\IENTARIES 
*23. Furthermore, Blackstone noted that "it is a settled and invariable princi-
ple in the laws of England, that every right when ,vith-held must have a rem-
edy, and every injury it's [sic] proper redress." Id. at :::109; see also Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803) (stating the general maxim that 
for every right there is a remedy). 
23. See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 61 (providing an elegant and powerful 
restatement of the view that in a pluralistic society individuals should have 
rights against governmental interference ,vith deeply personal "private 
choices," such as abortion and euthanasia). 
24. See Nicholas G. Smedira et al., Withholding and Withdrawal of Life 
Support from the Critically Ill, 322 NEW ENG. J. MEn. 309, 311 (1990); see also 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (''Medical advances have al-
tered the physiological conditions of death in ways that may be alarming: 
Highly invasive treatment may perpetuate human existence through a merger 
of body and machine that some might reasonably regard as an insult to life 
rather than as its continuation."). 
25. See Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy 
Age, 68lND. L.J. 727, 737 (1993). 
26. See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 199 (stating that individuals worry 
about the impact of "life's last stage on the character of [their] life as a whole, 
as we might worry about the effect of a play's last scene or a poem's last stanza 
on the entire creative work"). 
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served, "[m]aking someone die in a way that others approve, but he 
believes a horrifying contradiction of his life, is a devastating, odi-
ous form of tyranny.'>27 
My conclusion is that respect for individual autonomy should be 
the primary (but not the only) factor in deciding whether to afford a 
remedy for violations of the right to refuse medical treatment. Peo-
ple have a right to forgo treatment-without financial or legal pen-
alty to themselves or those they love-because this decision is one 
central to personal autonomy.28 A society that allows the refusal of 
medical treatment is a better one.29 Of course, greater autonomy in 
this area is not without cost, such as an increased risk of involun-
tary death,30 and perhaps an implicit financial pressure on ailing 
patients to die sooner than they might otherwise wish.31 On bal-
ance, however, freedom to make this decision, and to see that the 
choice is respected by the medical profession, seems worth the 
price.!l2 Thus, the courts can best serve what people perceive as 
their critical interests by deferring to their autonomous choices, 
even when the court disagrees with these choices.33 To do this, 
27. Id. at 217. 
28. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, 
Justice Stevens notes: 
Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and the con-
comitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our own 
morality are undoubtedly "so rooted in the traditions and conscience 
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," and indeed are essen-
tial incidents of the unalienable rights to life and liberty endowed us 
by our Creator. 
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
29. See Dworkin, supra note 25, at 727 (discussing the importance of 
autonomy in American culture). 
30. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-81 (1990) (holding that state interest in 
preventing error and abuse in the right to refuse treatment arena justified its 
clear and convincing evidence standard). See generally Yale Kamisar, Some 
Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. 
REV. 969 (1958) (arguing against any expansion of the right to refuse treat-
ment, on the ground that it would be impossible to devise safeguards that are 
both workable and adequately protective). 
31. See David Myland Kaufman & Richard B. Lipton, The Persistent Vege-
tative State: An Analysis of Clinical Correlates and Costs, 92 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 
381, 383 (1992) (finding that the bills for 13 patients in a persistent vegetative 
state averaged $170,000 and the length of stay at the hospital averaged almost 
200 days). For a discussion of health care payment alternatives, see Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel, Cost Savings At the End of Life: What Do the Data Show? 275 JAMA 
1907 (1996), and David E. Joranson, Are Health Care Reimbursement Policies a 
Barrier to Acute and Cancer Pain Management?, 9 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGl\1T. 
244 (1994). 
32. See Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of Human Life, 103 YALE L.J. 2049, 
2100-01 (1994) (book review). 
33. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: 
"Inconsequential" Cases and Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1251, 1252-54 
(1996) (citing cases where various United States Supreme Court Justices up-
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courts must be prepared to provide a remedy when a patient has ef-
fectively exercised his or her right to refuse treatment. 
To accommodate these interests properly, the court's focus must 
shift from a philosophical discourse about the value and sanctity of 
life to a greater understanding and appreciation of the aftermath of 
a violation of one's right to refuse treatment. Keeping individuals 
alive after they have made a competent determination to refuse 
medical treatment has a huge impact and does a great deal of dam-
age to their autonomy right, their loved ones, the medical profes-
sion, and society. Sharpening the focus leads to two preliminary 
conclusions about the current application of tort rules that proscribe 
liability for failing to follow a patient's wishes. First, courts should 
not view the patient's decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment as 
one that a physician or hospital may ignore without consequence. 
By failing to impose liability when a patient has decided to refuse 
treatment, the courts ignore a patient's autonomy interests and im-
pose their own moral judgment on the situation, determining pater-
nalistically that the choice to forgo treatment was incorrect or at 
least unworthy of respect by the legal system.34 Second, although 
the current legal structure provides the necessary doctrine to which 
plaintiffs can turn for remedy, legislative action might be necessary 
if plaintiffs are to receive compensation for such injuries. 
This Article argues that the courts, and if necessary the legisla-
tures, should ensure that patients have a remedy for violation of the 
important right to refuse medical treatment. 35 First, this Article 
explores the importance of an individual's autonomy interests in 
being allowed to make certain medical decisions. Part I considers 
relevant state and federal statutes and case law that have defined 
the right to refuse medical treatment. Part II discusses a recent 
case involving a violation of the right to refuse treatment and ex-
amines the court's rationale for refusing to provide a remedy. 
held the principles of fundamental freedoms even though they themselves felt 
the exercise of those freedoms to be "absurd" or "immature"). 
34. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 228 
(Ohio 1996) (holding that no "wrongful living" cause of action exists for the im-
proper administration of life prolonging medical treatment). But see Bouvia v. 
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "[t]he 
right to refuse medical treatment is basic and fundamental," and its exercise 
may not be "overridden by medical opinion"). 
35. Some commentators support the recovery of damages when a physician 
interferes ,vith the patient's right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Developments 
in the Law, Medical Technology and the Law, 103 lIARv. L. REv. 1519, 1673 
(1990); William C. Knapp & Fred Hamilton, "Wrongful Living": Resuscitation as 
Tortious Interference with a Patient's Right to Give Informed Refusal, 19 N. Ky. 
L. REV. 253, 254-59 (1992); A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the 
Right to Die: The Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625, 665 (1986); 
Nancy K Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 lIARv. L. REV. 375, 430 (1988); 
Tricia Jones Hackleman, Comment, Violation of an Individual's Right to Die: 
The Need for a Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1355 (1996). 
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In addition, the Article will review the treatment of other fun-
damental rights (such as abortion) and compare remedies for viola-
tions of these rights with the lack of remedy for the right to refuse 
medical treatment.36 When denials and violations of these other 
rights occur, both state and federal courts have not hesitated to pro-
tect the individual's exercise of the right, even if it finds the exercise 
distasteful or disagrees with the choice. 
Finally, Part III of the Article suggests how courts and legisla-
tures could enforce remedies for this right by seeking a creative ap-
proach to this difficult problem. 
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL AUTONOlVIY AND THE RIGHT TO 
REFUSE TREATMENT 
Respect for individuality and autonomy have long been central 
values in our society and legal system.37 Personal autonomy re-
quires recognition of one's rights to hold certain views, to make 
one's own choices, and to act on the basis of one's personal values 
and beliefs, even when others may believe you were mistaken. 38 In 
general, the more intense and personal the consequences of a choice 
and the less direct or significant the impact of that choice on others, 
the more compelling the claim to autonomy in the making of a given 
decision.39 Under this criterion, the case for respecting patient 
autonomy in decisions about individual health40 and bodily fate is 
36. See infra notes 232-39 and accompanying text. 
37. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
38. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIO· 
MEDICAL ETHICS 62, 82-87 (3d ed. 1989) (providing a full discussion of the new 
emphasis on patient autonomy concerns in bioethics); MaIjorie Maguire Shultz, 
From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE 
L.J. 219, 222 (1985) (arguing that medical treatment choices are vital to a per-
son's individual autonomy interests). For an overview of the informed consent 
doctrine, see RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
INFORMED CONSENT (1986). 
39. The claim to autonomy was most compellingly expressed by John Stu-
art Mill: 
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilised [sic] community, against his ,vill, is to pre-
vent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a 
sufficient warrant .... [T]he conduct from which it is desired to deter 
him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only 
part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is 
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns him-
self, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his 
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 12-13 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1989) (1859). 
40. In Western medicine, deference to the patient's interest is rooted in the 
Hippocratic tradition and in the doctor's status as a fiduciary. See ROBERT M. 
VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 21-25 (1981). Under these principles, 
the doctor's interest in income, prestige, and convenience, as well as in his or 
her own professional opinions and references, constitutes a less immediate and 
compelling claim to authority than that which derives from the patient's status 
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very strong.41 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "[n]o right 
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common 
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control 
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, 
unless by clear and unquestionable authority oflaw.'>42 
Central to the right to bodily integrity is the common law doc-
trine of consent.43 Strictly speaking, every unauthorized touching of 
a person may constitute a battery,44 and only the fact of consent 
renders the touching lawful.45 Consequently, in the medical context, 
the administration of medical treatment which involves any touch-
ing without the consent of the patient is prima facie unlawful46 and 
may give rise to civil liability.47 Because the unlawfulness stems 
as the bearer ofthe consequences. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (recognizing the physician's duty to keep a patient informed of 
medical procedures); In re Conroy, 486 A2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985) ("The doc-
trine of informed consent is the primary means developed in the law to protect 
this personal interest in the integrity of one's body."); see also Danuta Mendel-
son, Historical Evolution and Modern Implications of Concepts of Consent to, 
and Refusal ot Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 
4 (1996) (noting that in bioethics, the terms "autonomy" and "respect for auton-
omy" are associated with several ideas, such as privacy, voluntariness, choosing 
freely, and accepting responsibility for these choices). 
41. The classic statement of bodily value, in the medical conte}..-t, was ex-
pressed by Judge Cardozo, who stated: "Every human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and 
a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an 
assault .... " Schloendorfi'v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 
1914). A more recent statement of the importance of patient autonomy is found 
in 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMN FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & 
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE 
ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-
PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 2-4 (1982) (recommending that health care institu-
tions and professionals try to enhance patients' abilities to make decisions on 
their own behalves and to promote understanding of the available treatment 
options). 
42. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251 (refusing to compel personal injury plaintiff to 
undergo pretrial medical examination). 
43. See James Lindgren, Death by Default, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 
188-89 (1993) (stating that the common law doctrine of consent embodies fol-
lowing a competent person's treatment decisions). 
44. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 
§ 9, at 41 (5th ed. 1984). 
45. See id. § 9, at 42. 
46. There are some exceptions, for example, in cases of emergency where 
treatment is necessary to save the patient's life but the patient is unable to give 
consent to that treatment. See, e.g., Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 
1047, 1052 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that medical treatment will be lawful 
under the doctrine of implied consent when a medical emergency requires im-
mediate action to preserve the health or life of the patient). Some statutory ex-
ceptions have also been created regarding the requirement of consent through 
public health and mental health legislation. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massa-
chuetts, 197 U.S. 11,37-38 (1905) (upholding compulsory vaccination laws). 
47. To sustain an action for battery, two elements must be satisfied: 1) in-
tent to cause harmful, or offensive touching to another; and 2) the harmful con-
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from the fact of the non-consensual touching itself, the contact to 
the patient need not be harmful to give rise to liability, nor is there 
any requirement that the touching be done with hostility.48 It is 
therefore no defense that the treatment or procedure was skillfully 
performed, or that it was medically necessary and actually benefited 
the patient.49 When, however, a patient with decision-making ca-
pacity has given a legally effective consent to the particular inter-
vention,50 the patient's consent is a complete defense to any action 
for damages based on the tort of battery. 51 
The common law doctrine of "informed consent" has evolved 
from these fundamental principles and provides a firm basis for le-
gal recognition of the right of a patient with decision-making capac-
ity to refuse treatment. 52 Pursuant to this doctrine, a doctor must 
make full disclosure to a patient of all proposed medical procedures, 
the material risks of those procedures, and alternative courses of ac-
duct must occur. See Love v. City of Port Clinton, 524 N.E.2d 166, 167 (Ohio 
1988) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965». Any intentional, 
unwanted, harmful or offensive touching constitutes battery. See KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 44, § 9, at 41. 
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 cmt. a; see also, e.g., Cobbs v. 
Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (holding an operation without con-
sent is battery, but an operation where the patient consents to one type of 
treatment and receives another is negligence); Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25, 
31 (Ohio 1956) (holding that a battery occurs when a doctor performs treatment 
in the absence of consent). 
49. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 9, at 41 ("[T]he defendant is liable 
not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those rela-
tively trivial ones which are merely offensive and insulting."). A battery may 
be committed "even though the procedure is harmless or beneficial." Shapiro, 
469 N.E.2d at 1051. Thus, even actions such as placing a patient on a machine 
which enables the patient to breathe or receive nutrition, or resuscitating a pa-
tient's heart, could give rise to a plausible cause of action for battery if the 
treatment was not desired. 
50. For a consent to medical treatment to be legally effective the medical 
procedure or treatment must be one to which the person can give a legally valid 
consent, have the legal capacity to give a valid consent, and be a real consent-
i.e., it must be voluntarily given ,vith respect to the particular procedure or 
treatment performed by a particular individual, and the person must be aware, 
in broad terms, of the nature and purpose ofthe treatment to which he or she is 
consenting. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Pa-
tients from Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REv. 291, 352 n.218, 379-80 (1994). 
51. See Lacey, 139 N.E.2d at 32. 
52. The doctrine of informed consent is founded on the common law tort of 
battery. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 9, at 39-42. The doctrine of in-
formed consent affirms a patient's right to determine his or her own destiny in 
medical matters, promotes autonomy, guards against overreaching on the part 
of the physician, protects physical and psychic integrity and thus privacy, and 
compensates both from affronts to dignity and from some of the unintended 
consequences of modern medical care. See Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the 
Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in 
Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 413, 414-15; see also, Jay Katz, In-
formed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 137, 147-50 
(1977) (discussing the history of the informed consent doctrine). 
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tion.53 On the basis of the information received from the doctor, the 
patient may then choose among the available treatment options. 54 
The doctrine therefore establishes an obligation of health care pro-
fessionals to respect patients' rights in making treatment deci-
sions.55 This right of a patient with decision-making capacity to give 
consent to treatment, after having been fully informed as to the ma-
terial risks of the proposed treatment, logically involves a corre-
sponding right to refuse treatment. 56 
These common law background principles provided the founda-
tion for courts that faced the task of addressing and defining an in-
dividual's right to refuse medical treatment, including life-
sustaining treatment.57 The doctrine of informed consent, which in-
53. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 776, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(permitting action against surgeon and hospital for paralysis resulting from 
back operation without adequate disclosure of risks); Payne v. Marion Gen. 
Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 1043, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a physician has 
a duty to obtain informed consent before implementing a DNR order); Lacey, 
139 N.E.2d at 31 (requiring proper consent from a patient even where a benefi-
cial or harmless operation is performed). 
54. See Parkins v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D. Conn. 1993) 
("[Doctors] must disclose all the treatment options and the risks associated 
therewith in order to ensure that the patient has sufficient information to make 
an intelligent choice."). 
55. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985) ("'Under this doc-
trine, no medical procedure may be performed without a patient's consent, ob-
tained after explanation of the nature of the treatment, substantial risks, and 
alternative therapies.'" (quoting Norman L. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to De-
cline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of 
Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 237 (1973»); see also Law, supra note 1, at 285-88 
(defining the right to self-determination and autonomy as characterizing the 
doctrine of informed consent). 
56. See Shultz, supra note 38, at 232 (''If the key issue is knowledge and 
choice regarding the fate of one's body, there is no meaningful difference be-
tween a decision that will be implemented by touching the body and one that 
will [not]."); see also Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-03 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (holding that an adult of sound mind has the right, in the exercise of 
control over his body, to determine whether or not to submit to medical treat-
ment, and thus it follows that such a patient has the right to refuse any medi-
cal treatment even that which may save or prolong life); Payne, 549 N.E.2d at 
1050 (holding that a physician has a duty to obtain informed consent before 
implementing a DNR order). See generally Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, 
Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causa-
tion, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 610 (providing a doctrinal analysis of informed 
consent). In addition to the common law right to refuse treatment, a limited 
right for competent patients to refuse treatment exists under state statutes. See 
infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
57. Several cases have discussed the right to privacy and presented consti-
tutional support for the right to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. 
Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 681-82 (Ariz. 1987) (en bane); Bartling v. Superior 
Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984); Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 425 
A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en bane); In re 
Browning, 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 
647 (N.J. 1976); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). For a thor-
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eludes the patient's choice to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, is well accepted today in certain contexts.58 The jurisprudence 
that has developed is a mixture of common law, statutes, and fed-
eral and state constitutional glosses.59 From these sources of law, 
culminating \vith Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health,60 the first "right to die" case to come before the United 
States Supreme Court, the existence of a fundamental legal right to 
make choices about one's medical treatment is now firmly estab-
lished.61 
A. Supreme Court Recognition of the Right to Refuse Treatment 
In the 1990 decision, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department 
of Health,62 the United States Supreme Court, for the first time, 
found a constitutional dimension to the right to refuse medical 
treatment and held that the constitutional right to liberty is impli-
cated by providing medical treatment without the patient's con-
sent.63 
ough discussion of the right to die decisions, see Rebecca Morgan & Barbara 
Harty-Golder, Constitutional Development of Judicial Criteria in Right-to-Die 
Cases: From Brain Dead to Persistent Vegetative State, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
721 (1988). 
58. There were at least 84 appellate decisions addressing the right to die 
issued prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan. See George J. Annas, 
The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill 
and Kevorkian, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 875, 882 (1996); see also Cruzan v. Harmon, 
760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (listing 54 reported decisions from 
1976 to 1988). 
In a number of the earlier cases, the courts denied the right of a patient to 
refuse treatment and ordered that treatment be administered against the pa-
tient's e~'Pressed wishes. See, e.g., In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 
331 F.2d 1000, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 
752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965). However, the clear trend emerging from more recent 
case law is that the patient's right to refuse treatment, even life-saving treat-
ment, will be upheld. See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410-11 (N.J. 1987). 
59. Some states recognize a right to refuse treatment based on a liberty or 
privacy interest. See, e.g., Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 682 (privacy interest); In re 
Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (same); In re Lawrence, 
579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991) (liberty interest). The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest, 
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment, including life-sustaining treatment. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). Thus, following Cruzan, it is clear that pa-
tients have a liberty interest in refusing resuscitation. Whether this liberty in-
terest is violated, however, is determined by weighing the liberty interest 
against the relevant state interests. See id. at 279. 
60. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
61. See MARGARET OTLOWSKI, VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND THE COl\ThION 
LAw 35-44 (1997); Alan Meisel, A Retrospective on Cruzan, 20 LAw MEn. & 
HEALTH CARE 340, 342 (1992). 
62. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
63. Id. at 278-79. The United States Supreme Court stated: 
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In 1983, Nancy Cruzan suffered severe and irreversible brain 
damage in a car accident.64 Although doctors aggressively treated 
Ms. Cruzan, she was ultimately diagnosed as being in a persistent 
vegetative state-"a condition in which a person exhibits motor re-
flexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function."o5 
After six years without any sign of recovery, Ms. Cruzan's parents 
asked the state hospital to discontinue life support and allow her to 
die.66 The hospital refused the request without a judicial order sup-
porting such an action.67 Although Ms. Cruzan's parents obtained a 
court order from the state probate court permitting the discontinua-
tion of life-sustaining treatment,68 the Missouri Supreme Court 
overturned the order.69 The state supreme court determined that 
life-sustaining treatment could be removed only on clear and con-
vincing evidence of the patient's desire to have the particular 
treatment in question removed under the circumstances faced by 
the patient.70 The Cruzans petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court for review.71 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the 
Missouri requirement of "clear and convincing evidence" that the 
patient would want life-sustaining treatment discontinued before 
permitting termination of such care did not violate the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution.72 First, the Court recog-
nized that one of the primary means of protecting the notion of bod-
ily integrity is the informed consent doctrine.73 As a result, the ma-
jority decided that the ''logical corollary of the doctrine of informed 
This is the first case in which we have been squarely presented 
with the issue whether the United States Constitution grants what is 
in common parlance referred to as a "right to die." 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, \vithout due process of law." 
The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may 
be inferred from our prior decisions. 
Id. at 277-78 (citations omitted). 
64. See id. at 265. 
65. Id. at 266. 
66. See id. at 267. 
67. See id. at 268. 
68. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,411-12 (Mo. 1988) (en bane), 
affd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
69. See id. at 427. 
70. See id. at 419. 
71. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 492 U.S. 917 (1989) 
(granting petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court). 
72. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280-82. The Supreme Court found that "a 
State may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a 
particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in 
the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally pro-
tected interests of the individual." Id. at 282. 
73. See id. at 269. 
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consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to con-
sent, that is, to refuse treatment.',u The Cruzan Court observed 
that "most courts have based a right to refuse treatment either 
solely on the common law right to informed consent or on both the 
common law right and a constitutional privacy right.,,75 Here, the 
Court dismissed the notion that the constitutional right of privacy 
includes a right to refuse treatment, and instead stated that the is-
sue is more properly analyzed in terms of Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty interest.76 All nine Justices agreed on the existence of this 
liberty interest, disagreeing only on how it should be balanced with 
the state's expressed interests in the protection and preservation of 
human life.77 
74. Id. at 270. Several earlier state court decisions had based their recog-
nition of the "right to die" solely on the common law. See, e.g., Barber v. Supe-
rior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Estate of Longeway, 
549 N.E.2d 292,297 (TIL 1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947,951 (Me. 1987); In 
re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 422-23 (N.J. 1987); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y. 
1981). 
Among the prior decisions discussed in the majority opinion were several 
cases which held that patients have an interest in refusing to submit to specific 
medical procedures. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) 
(holding that Washington's procedures for administrating anti-physchotic 
medication to prisoners were sufficient to satisfy due process concerns, but 
stating that "[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's 
body represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty"); Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-33 (1905) (balancing an individual's in-
terest in declining smallpox vaccine against the state's interest in preventing 
disease). 
75. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. 
76. See id. at 271, 278; cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Prop-
erty Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555 (1997) (arguing that bodily integrity should be 
conceptualized as a fundamental property right rather than a liberty interest). 
77. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. The fact that the four dissenters and Justice 
O'Connor all explicitly recognized that there is such a protected constitutional 
interest has led some to say that the Cruzan case was the first to find a consti-
tutional right to die. This contention extends the majority opinion beyond its 
explicit terms. See BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL., HEALTH LAw § 17-3, at 694 (1995) 
(noting that the majority rejected a right to die and focused instead on a right 
to refuse treatment). In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated: 
I agree that a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions and that 
the refusal of artificially delivered food and water is encompassed 
within that liberty interest. 
Requiring a competent adult to endure [procedures for artificial 
hydration and nutrition] against her \vill burdens the patient's lib-
erty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treat-
ment. Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
must protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal 
decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery 
of food and water. 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287,289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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The majority balanced Ms. Cruzan's right to refuse medical 
treatment against the state's interest in the protection and preser-
vation of human life.78 The Court determined that Missouri had 
permissibly sought to advance its interests by adopting "a clear and 
convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian 
seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed 
to be in a persistent vegetative state.'>79 It reasoned that imposition 
of this procedural requirement was justified both by the importance 
of the rights involved and by the appropriateness of placing the risk 
of error on those attempting to terminate treatment, as an errone-
ous decision to withdraw treatment is more permanent than an er-
roneous decision not to withdraw treatment.so 
The notion that the state has an interest in the preservation of 
human life independent of the patient's own interests led Justice 
BrennanB1 and Justice Stevens82 to write spirited dissents. Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, rejected the 
clear and convincing evidence standard as unduly burdensome on 
78. Although a patient does have a liberty interest in the right to refuse 
medical treatment, see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278, this right is not absolute ac-
cording to the Court, see id. at 279. The state's asserted interests were "the 
protection and preservation of human life," id. at 280, and the safeguarding of 
personal choice on the decision to refuse life support, see id. at 281. 
The interests most commonly asserted by states in right-to-die cases are: 
"(1) [T]he preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent 
third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical in-
tegrity of the medical profession." Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. 
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977) (distilling these four interests 
from other cases). The court in McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990), 
identified a fifth state interest: "[E]ncouraging the charitable and humane care 
of those whose lives may be artificially extended under conditions which have 
the prospect of providing at least a modicum of qualify living." Id. at 621. 
The courts balance the states' interests against the patients' right to refuse 
treatment, irrespective of whether the patient bases the right to refuse treat-
ment on informed consent, liberty interest, or both. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 
A2d 1209, 1221-22 (N.J. 1985) (right to refuse treatment based on informed 
consent); Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 71 (right to refuse treatment based on Constitu-
tion); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (right to refuse 
treatment based on informed consent and the Constitution). 
79. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284. 
80. See id. at 283. 
81. See id. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
82. See id. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stevens 
opined that the Constitution required the "State to care for Nancy Cruzan's life 
in a way that gives appropriate respect to her own best interests." Id. at 331 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He concluded that the "best interests of the individ-
ual, especially when buttressed by the interests of all related third parties, 
must prevail over any general state policy that simply ignores those interests." 
Id. at 350 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Missouri had only an "abstract, undif-
ferentiated interest in the preservation of lifer,]" Ms. Cruzan's best interests 
would allow a decision to terminate nutrition and hydration. Id. at 331 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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patients and their families.83 In dissent, Justice Brennan asserted 
that the majority had undervalued the liberty interest at stake and 
had given too much deference to the state interest, permitting the 
state to develop procedural law inconsistent with the effective exer-
cise of the right to forgo life-sustaining treatment.84 "[T]he State 
has no legitimate general interest in someone's life, completely ab-
stracted from the interest of the person living that life, that could 
outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical treatment.',ss 
Justice Brennan contended that a state could not interfere with 
an individual's fundamental right to forgo unwanted medical treat-
ment unless the state employed means narrowly tailored to a suffi-
ciently important state interest.86 Although he recognized that Mis-
souri had a legitimate state interest in Ms. Cruzan's welfare, 
Justice Brennan refused to recognize that this included a general-
ized interest in the protection oflife.87 Likewise, Justice Stevens ob-
served: 
However commendable may be the State's interest in human 
life, it cannot pursue that interest by appropriating Nancy 
Cruzan's life as a symbol for its own purposes. Lives do not 
exist in abstraction from persons, and to pretend otherwise is 
83. See id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also DWORKIN, supra note 
19, at 216-17 (suggesting that the alleged intrinsic value of prolonging some-
body's life cannot justify the government's preventing him or her from meeting 
death sooner if he or she reasonably prefer that course, and arguing that per-
sonal autonomy prevails if its exercise would not offend any rights or interest, 
but only detached values). 
84. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (''Missouri and 
this Court have displaced [the patient's] own assessment of the processes asso-
ciated with dying. They have discarded evidence of her ,vill, ignored her values, 
and deprived her of the right to a decision as closely approximating her own 
choice as humanly possible."). 
85. ld. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Disagreeing with the evidentiary 
standard as adopted and applied in the case, Justice Brennan addressed the 
claim that the state was justified in its allocation of the "risk of error" in a way 
that favored "the status quo," stating: 
An erroneous decision [that is, one that did not reflect the patient's 
true ,vishes] to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration, to be 
sure, ,villlead to failure of that last remnant of physiological life, the 
brain stem, and result in complete brain death. An erroneous deci-
sion not to terminate life support, however, robs a patient of the very 
qualities protected by the right to avoid unwanted medical treatment. 
His own degraded existence is perpetuated; his family's suffering is 
protracted; the memory he leaves behind becomes more and more dis-
torted. Even a later decision to grant him his wish cannot undo the 
intervening harm. 
ld. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
86. See id. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 388 (1978)). 
87. See id. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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not to honor but to desecrate the State's responsibility for pro-
t t · lifi 88 ec mg e. 
Although the Court recognized that the right to refuse treat-
ment was not absolute, the Cruzan majority emphasized the impor-
tant autonomy interest at stake in personal decisions concerning 
medical care and required the government to have some justifica-
tion for burdening that decision-making.89 
Cruzan strongly supports the proposition that the state and 
federal courts should robustly protect the right to refuse medical 
treatment, even if they are not constitutionally obliged to do SO.90 In 
fact, during the post-Cruzan era, virtually all courts have affirmed 
88. Id. at 356-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further added 
that such a position is both "patently unconstitutional" and "dangerous" be-
cause it would allow states to prefer death for the incompetent in the same way 
that Missouri prefers life. Id. at 354 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
89. Because the state of Missouri was paying for Ms. Cruzan's care, and 
did not dispute its ability to do so, the Court never addressed whether the cost 
of the care was a relevant consideration. As one commentator has noted: 
The decision does not explain whether the person paying for the care 
... has any special status in determining what treatment should be 
provided. As a consequence, it does not determine whether a patient's 
family might be required to pay for extremely costly care believed to 
be entirely repugnant, but which the state requires as a matter of 
state law. In addition, the Cruzan decision does not determine 
whether a state may discontinue treatment of some patients, or 
choose not to commence it initially, because the state ,vi shes not to 
pay for that treatment. 
FuRROWETAL., supra note 77, § 17-2, at 692. 
90. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Cruzan Court, conceded: "The 
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior de-
cisions." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. He repeatedly framed the protected interest 
as one in refusing treatment, and stated that it was "the forced administration 
of ... treatment" that implicated the interest. Id. at 279. 
Justice O'Connor's concurrence similarly stated that "the liberty interest 
in refusing medical treatment flows from decisions involving the State's inva-
sions into the body. Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined 
,vith our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often 
deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the . . . Due Process 
Clause." Id. at 287-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
Justice Brennan, in dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, 
also emphasized a "fundamental right to be free of unwanted" treatment. Id. at 
302 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He found an individual has "a right to evaluate 
... treatment ... and ... [decide] whether to subject oneself to the intrusion." 
Id. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Likewise, Justice Stevens' dissent emphasized, too, that at stake was 
"[h]ighly invasive treatment." Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His broader 
language about "the liberty to make ... choices constitutive of private life," id. 
at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and his assertion that "[c]hoices about death 
touch the core of liberty," id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting), is married to lan-
guage on "rights pertaining to bodily integrity" and the right to be free from 
"physically invasive" procedures, id. at 342 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the right of competent and incompetent patients to terminate medi-
cal treatment.91 
B. Further Recognition of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment-
The Legislative Response 
The publicity and concern generated by the Cruzan case 
brought public focus to the inadequacy of protection for the right to 
refuse treatment.92 In response, Congress and state legislatures 
passed a variety of laws.93 In 1990, the same year Cruzan was de-
cided, Congress enacted the Patient Self Determination Act 
(''PSDA''),94 a federal law requiring every hospital and nursing home 
to provide information about advance directives to all patients upon 
admission.95 The PSDA further required institutions to develop 
policies addressing advance directives and to notify patients of the 
substance of these policies.96 
State legislatures also began passing laws to help safeguard the 
right to refuse medical treatment.97 Today, all states and the Dis-
91. For a discussion of courts' recognition of the right to terminate medical 
treatment, see Larry Gostin, Life and Death Choices After Cruzan, 19 LAw MED. 
& HEALTH CARE 9 (1991), L. Gregory Pawlson, Impact of the Cruzan Decision on 
Medical Practice, 19 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 69 (1991), and Fenella Rouse, 
Advance Directives: Where Are We Heading After Cruzan?, 18 LAw MED. & 
HEALTH CARE 353 (1990). 
92. See Elizabeth McCloskey, Between Isolation and Intrusion: The Patient 
Self-Determination Act, 19 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 80, 81 (1991). 
93. For a comprehensive account of practices and laws governing the for-
going of life-sustaining treatment and surrogate decision-making, see 2 MEISEL, 
supra note 7, §§ 14.1-.10, at 349-69. 
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f), 1396a(w) (1994) (requiring health care providers 
participating in Medicaid or Medicare programs to inform competent adult pa-
tients, no matter what their reason for admission, about state laws on advance 
directives and to record any advance directives the patients may have). For 
further information on the PSDA, see, for example, McCloskey, supra note 92, 
and Margot L. White & John C. Fletcher, The Patient Self Determination Act: 
On Balance, More Help Than Hindrance, 266 JAMA 410 (1991). 
95. See White & Fletcher, supra note 94"at 410. 
96. Specifically, the PSDA requires that health care providers "maintain 
written policies and procedures" applicable to "all adult individuals receiving 
medical care" concerning "an individual's rights under State [statutory and 
common] law " . to make decisions concerning such medical care, including 
the right to accept or refuse ... treatment and the right to formulate advance 
directives." 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f)(I)(A)(i), 1396a(w)(I)(A)(i). Furthermore, at 
the time of admission to the health care facility, providers must give patients 
written information about their own policies concerning such directives. See 
Kelly C. Mulholland, Protecting the Right to Die: The Patient Self-Determination 
Act of 1990, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 609, 610 (1991). Although the PSDA does 
not create any substantive rights concerning medical decision-making, it recog-
nizes that such rights exist independent of the Act, and more specifically that 
state law has created and acknowledged the existence of such rights. See id. at 
628. 
97. See 2 MEISEL, supra note 7, § 10.12, at 27 n.l00 (collecting statutes); id. 
at 29 n.l07 (collecting cases); Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead Than Disabled?: 
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trict of Columbia have recognized the right to refuse treatment 
through the enactment of a variety of natural death statutes, in-
cluding living will laws, 98 durable power of attorney for health care 
laws,99 do not resuscitate ("DNR") order laws/oo and health care sur-
rogate laws.IOI In addition, medical organizations, such as the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations 
("JCAHO") now require that health care facilities create a mecha-
nism to assist patients in the development of advance directives. 102 
Should Courts Recognize a "Wrongful Living" Cause of Action When Doctors 
Fail to Honor Patients' Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149, 228 
n.48 (1997) (providing a list of state living will and advance directive statutes); 
see also Charles P. Sabatino, Death in the Legislature: Inventing Legal Tools for 
Autonomy, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 309, 313 (1991-1992) (discussing 
typical advance directive statutes). 
98. Living wills are a misnomer in that they have nothing to do with dona-
tive transfers at death. Living wills are documents in which individuals state 
whether they desire life-sustaining treatment during the final stages of life, 
and if so, which treatments can be provided and under what circumstances. 
See David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255, 
1258 (1994). Generally living will statutes apply only to patients who are ter-
minally ill or permanently unconscious and limit the patients' treatment with-
drawal orders to artificial nutrition and hydration. See id. at 1259; see also 
Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 737, 
796-97 (stating that many such statutes were enacted in states that already 
created the same rights by judicial decision and the statutes merely provided a 
procedure for channeling these rights). 
99. The durable power of attorney in health care statutes allow a patient to 
appoint an individual to make medical decisions on the patient's behalf in the 
event that the patient is unable to make medical decisions for his or herself. 
See Orentlicher, supra 98, at 1259. 
100. DNR statutes allow patients to state that they do not want to receive 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") if they suffer cardiac arrest. See id. at 
1260. CPR can be defined as measures "to restore cardiac function or to sup-
port ventilation in the event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest." N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAw § 2961(4) (McKinney 1993). These statutes limit the patient's 
treatment withdrawal orders to one kind of treatment, CPR. See Orentlicher, 
supra note 98, at 1260. 
101. Health care surrogate laws give authority to family members and 
friends to make end-of-life decisions for permanently unconscious patients. See 
Orentlicher, supra note 98, at 1260-61. Patients can combine a living will and 
a durable power of attorney appointment. See id. at 1259. The patient in-
structs the appointed surrogate to follow the patient's instructions regarding 
treatment. See id. If the instructions in the living will fail to give enough 
guidance to the surrogate, the surrogate has the authority to make his or her 
best judgment concerning the patient's preferences. See id. These statutes of-
ten apply to patients with any medical condition and are less likely to restrict 
the types of treatments that the surrogate can order to be withdrawn. See id. 
at 1260. See generally Colleen M. O'Connor, Statutory Surrogate Consent Pro· 
visions: An Overview and Analysis, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 
128 (1996) (analyzing issues common to many surrogate consent provisions). 
102. See 1 JOINT COMMN ON ACCREDITATION OF Hosps., 1994 ACCREDITATION 
MANuAL FOR HOSPITALS 157 (1993); see also AMERICAN MED. AsS'N, CURRENT 
OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 2.19 (1986) ("The 
preference of the individual should prevail when determining whether extraor-
HeinOnline -- 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1055 1998
1998] BEYOND MISGUIDED PATERNALISM 1055 
The JCAHO designed directives such as living wills to give physi-
cians information about an individual's treatment preferences.lo3 
All of the statutes and regulations demonstrate acceptance by a 
majority of the public of the right to refuse treatment. 
One primary failing of these statutes is that most people, for 
understandable reasons, fail to complete formal advance direc-
tives. lo4 A recent study estimates that between ten and twenty-five 
percent of the adult population in the United States has completed 
formal advance directives (with some estimates as low as five per-
cent).I05 Additionally, as noted earlier, even if a patient is one of the 
few who has completed an advance directive, no guarantee exists 
that the doctor will obey the directive. lOS Indeed, some commenta-
dinary life-prolonging measures should be undertaken in the event of terminal 
illness."). 
103. To be accredited by the JCAHO, a health care institution must have a 
mechanism for facilitating the family or legal guardian's participation in mak-
ing decisions for the patient throughout the course of treatment. See JCAHO 
Requires Hospitals to Address Ethical Issues, 7 MED. ETHICS ADVISOR 121, 123 
(1991). This mechanism might be an ethics committee or an ethics consultant. 
See id. at 122; see also Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Di-
rectives for Life-Sustaining Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882, 886 (1991) (finding 
that the presence of advance directives did not increase likelihood that an indi-
vidual's treatment ,vishes would be followed); Rhoden, supra note 35, at 430 
("The judiciary's reaction to those few cases in which patients or their families 
have sued for damages for nonconsensual treatment represents another in-
stance of the legal system's uncritical endorsement of the medical profession's 
activist approach."). See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, 
Living Wills: Past, Present, and Future, 1 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 9, 10 (1990) 
(discussing the history of the living ,vill). 
104. See DAVID W. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND 
DYING 277-78 (1981) (noting that most persons do not like to dwell on the pros-
pect of their own death). 
105. See HEALTH, EDuc. & HUMAN SERVS. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, PuB. No. GAOIHEHS-95-135, PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT: 
PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DffiECTIVES BUT EFFECTIVENESS 
UNCERTAIN 8 (1995). The GAO study also reported that only 9% of patients un-
der age 30 had an advance directive, but 35% of those over age 75 had one. See 
id. at 9; see also Elizabeth R. Gamble et al., Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior 
of Elderly Persons Regarding Living Wills, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 277, 
278-79 (1991) (finding that although 39 of 75 elderly persons knew about living 
wills, none had executed one and only two had discussed their preference for 
limiting treatment with their physician); Martha Terry & Steven Zweig, Preva-
lence of Advance Directives and Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in Community Nurs-
ing Facilities, 3 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 141, 141 (1994) (reporting that in a study 
of eight rural community nursing facilities, less than one-third of patients had 
advance directives). 
106. See OrentIicher, supra note 98, at 1281. To support his thesis that leg-
islation has not changed physician behavior, OrentIicher cites several studies 
that found physicians often overrode living wills when they disagreed with the 
patients' choices, including providing undesired treatment when the physician 
felt it was appropriate. Id. at 1281-83; see also Panagiota V. Caralis & Jeffrey 
S. Hammond, Attitudes of Medical Students, Housestaff, and Faculty Physicians 
Toward Euthanasia and Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment, 20 CRITICAL 
CARE MED. 683, 686-90 (1992) (discussing findings that medical personnel are 
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tors have noted that a financial incentive may keep certain people-
those with health insurance-alive despite their wishes. lo7 Finally, 
many of these statutes actually provide immunity to the physician 
who fails to obey an individual's living will or advance directive.lOB 
Thus, although these statutes buttress the ideal of patient auton-
omy, they do not adequately protect the patient's right to refuse 
treatment, and they fail to provide an incentive for the medical pro-
fession to respect a patient's considered exercise of the right to ref-
use treatment. Thus, the statutes fail to address the real problem-
physician ability to ignore a patient's wishes. 
C. Physician Responses to the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 
Despite the general acceptance of the right to refuse medical 
treatment shared by the public, the courts, and the legislatures, a 
large disjunction exists between what the law requires and the ac-
tual practice in the health care community.I09 Commentators have 
more likely to comply with passive euthanasia by failing to take action to pro-
long life, than with active euthanasia by taking deliberate action that causes 
death); Danis et al., supra note 103, at 886-87 (noting that a continuing prob-
lem with living \vills is the umvillingness of many physicians to honor them). 
The existence of physician resistance to living wills has also been a source 
of concern for the nurses who work ,vith them. Two nursing journals have dis-
cussed nurses' responsibilities when physicians fail to honor patients' wishes. 
See Barbara Springer Edwards, When a Living Will Is Ignored, AM. J. NURSING, 
July 1994, at 64, 64-65; Cindy Hylton Rushton, Ask the Experts, CRITICAL CARE 
NURSE, Feb. 1993, at 61, 61-62. 
107. See generally Bobinski, supra note 50, at 301-09 (discussing the theo-
ries underlying the relationship between economic incentives and the behavior 
of physicians); Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical 
and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708 (1986) (discussing the loss to physician autonomy un-
der managed care); Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, 
and Financial Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Con-
tainment Injuries, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1,22-41 (1993) (discussing utili-
zation review, financial risk-shifting, and effects of cost containment on quality 
of care). 
108. See Gelfand, supra note 98, at 771-72 (noting that legislation providing 
for living wills frequently contains no penalty for physicians who do not honor 
them); Maggie J. Randall Robb, Living Wills: The Right to Refuse Life-
Sustaining Medical Treatment-A Right Without A Remedy?, 23 U. DAYTON L. 
REv. 169, 173-77 (1997) (discussing the various types of immunity provided to 
physicians who fail to obey a patient's living will). In addition, all state living 
will and health care proxy statutes confer some sort of immunity from civil or 
criminal liability on health care providers who in good faith comply with a 
properly executed living will or the instructions of a proxy acting in accordance 
with the patient's wishes or in the patient's best interest. See id. 
109. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 35, at 420-29 (discussing the combination 
of factors that influence doctors to intervene on behalf of life); Sidney H. Wan-
zer et al., Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly III Patients, 310 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 955, 956 (1984) ("The physician's schooling, residency training, 
and professional oath emphasize positive actions to sustain and prolong 
life .... "); see also JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE? PATERNALISM IN 
HEALTH CARE 162-72 (1982) (discussing the conflicts between patients and phy-
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examined this disjunction and have provided several reasons to ex-
plain physicians' reluctance to obey a patient's decision to exercise 
his or her right to refuse medical treatment. no First, some commen-
tators have argued that fear of liability111 affects physicians' will-
ingness to follow advance directives which ask that life-sustaining 
treatment be \vithheld.1l2 In addition, some commentators have 
noted that while physicians fear liability for failing to provide suffi-
cient treatment, either no sanctions, or only mild sanctions, poten-
tially apply to a physician who fails to abide by a patient's treat-
sicians that arise when patients refuse medical treatment); KATZ, supra note 
11, at 183-84 (discussing the pervasiveness of medical uncertainty); Joel M. 
Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physicians' Responses 
to Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. REV. 445, 472 (1989) (reporting that 85% of 
California physicians surveyed knew no details about the state's living ,vill 
statute). 
110. See Zinberg, supra note 109, at 452. Zinberg, a physician and an attor-
ney, interviewed 18 physicians in Vermont and 39 physicians in and around 
Los Angeles concerning their experiences with, and understanding of, advance 
directives. ld. He identified three reasons for physician failure to honor pa-
tients' advance directives regarding the ,vithholding of treatment: "(1) [F]ear of 
liability; (2) the perception that directives interpose an unnecessary additional 
control over, and interfere ,vith, the physicians' professional actions; and (3) the 
perception that directives implicitly question the physicians' judgment of the 
patients' best interest." ld. at 482. 
111. See Renee M. Goetzler & Mark A. Moskowitz, Changes in Physician At-
titudes Toward Limiting Care of Critically III Patients, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL 
MED. 1537, 1538 (1991) (finding that physicians were concerned about malprac-
tice liability in deciding how to treat critically ill patients). The courts have 
been clear that liability should not be a serious concern for physicians and oth-
ers who participate in a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment if they act 
reasonably and in good faith. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 415-16 (N.J. 
1987) ("[N]o civil or criminal liability ,vill be incurred by any person who, in 
good faith reliance on the procedures established in this opinion, ,vithdraws 
life-sustaining treatment at the request of an informed and competent patient 
who has undergone the required independent medical examination described 
above."). 
112. Physicians fear liability from ,vithdrawing treatment even though 
there has never been a successful suit or prosecution against a physician or 
faculty member for removing treatment in accordance ,vith the instructions of 
the patient or the instruction of the family. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Le-
gal and Ethical Problems in Decisions for Death, 14 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 
141, 142 (1986) ("If patients behaved as irrationally about treatment as physi-
cians do about liability, the patients would be labeled incompetent."); Alan 
Meisel, Legal Myths About Terminating Life Support, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL 
MED. 1497, 1497-98 (1991) (stating that the small number oflawsuits brought 
involving termination of life support have all been resolved in favor of the phy-
sician); David Orentlicher, The Right to Die After Cruzan, 264 JAMA 2444, 
2446 (1990) ("No person has ever been found liable for ,vithdra,ving life-
sustaining treatment ,vithout court permission."); Robert F. Weir & Larry 
Gostin, Decisions to Abate Life-Sustaining Treatment for Nonautonomous Pa-
tients: Ethical Standards and Legal Liability for Physicians after Cruzan, 264 
JAMA 1846, 1852 (1990) ("Every court of final decision in every jurisdiction 
that has addressed the question of physician liability . . . has found physicians 
participating in the cases to be free from civil or criminal sanctions."). 
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ment decision.ll3 Others have further speculated that physicians' 
failure to abide by refusal of treatment decisions reflects a basic 
reluctance to abandon the paternalistic model of decision-making.114 
The commentators state that many physicians simply do not 
want to allow their patients to share actively in decision-making, or 
do not trust the patients to make these choices because the physi-
cians believe that medical training and expertise should be required 
for every treatment decision.115 In addition, many physicians mor-
113. See Orentlicher, supra note 98, at 1293; Ben A. Rich, The Values His-
tory: A New Standard of Care, 40 EMORY L.J. 1109, 1117 (1991). For example, 
many advance directive statutes have severe penalties, including felony convic-
tions, for those who might falsify or destroy a living ,vill, but the actions of a 
physician who refuses to follow the terms of a patient's living will (or to refer 
the patient to another physician who is ,villing to comply,vith the directive) are 
only designated to be unprofessional conduct potentially subject to sanction by 
the State Medical Board. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-113 (1997). Al-
though every state and the District of Columbia have enacted Natural Death 
Acts, only approximately seventeen states have any sanctions against physi-
cians for a violation of a Natural Death Act, and of those, approximately six 
provide that the physician may be civilly or criminally liable. See, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. § 18.12.070(a) (Michie 1996); ARK. CODEANN. § 20-17-209(a) (Michie 1991 
& Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-206(1) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-
11-108(a) (1984 & Supp. 1997). 
114. Hard paternalism accepts the proposition that it is morally justifiable 
for others to protect competent adults, against their will, from the harmful con-
sequences of their fully voluntary choices. See Rich, supra note 113, at 1118 
n.34. Joel Zinberg also reports: 
One interviewee volunteered that a substantial number of his col-
leagues dislike directives because they believe directives would curtail 
doctors' control of treatment. This observation is partially confirmed 
by the fact that many interviewees strongly opposed the interposition 
of formal ethics committees. Only three interviewees in each state 
agreed that other physicians or an ethics committee should be con-
sulted. 
Zinberg, supra note 109, at 482-83 (citations omitted). See generally KATZ, su-
pra note 11 (explaining that hard paternalism is causing resistance to patient 
efforts to exercise some degree of autonomy in decisions about their medical 
treatment). For a detailed analysis of this type of physician behavior and the 
implications for patient autonomy, see David Orentlicher, The Illusion of Pa-
tient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992), and Ben A. Rich, 
The Assault on Privacy in Health Care Decisionmaking, 68 DENY. U. L. REV. 1 
(1991). 
115. Research studies have concluded that a significant number of physi-
cians question the ability of patients to make decisions at the end of life. See, 
e.g., Kent W. Davidson et al., Physicians' Attitudes on Advance Directives, 262 
JAMA 2415, 2416 tb1.3 (1989) (indicating that 58.8% of responding doctors 
strongly agreed that "[a] potential problem ,vith advance directives is that pa-
tients could change their minds about 'heroic' treatment after becoming termi-
nally ill," and 32.4% strongly agreed that "[t]he training and experience ofphy-
sicians gives them greater authority than patients in decisions about 
,vithholding 'heroic' treatment"). 
Certain members of society receive less respect for their decisions regard-
ing medical treatment than others. Specifically, in assessing terminally ill pa-
tients' wishes to die, women's views are considered less credible. See Lisa C. 
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ally believe that they should not be engaged in helping people die. us 
However, as several legal commentators have observed, life-
sustaining treatment decisions are value-based and do not require 
medical knowledge. ll7 
Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medical 
Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487, 507 n.112 (1992). Pro-
fessor Ikemoto quotes a study of appellate decisions in right to die cases that 
uncovered the following differences in the treatment of men and women: 
"The first difference is the courts' view that a man's opinions are ra-
tional and a woman's remarks are unreflective, emotional, or imma-
ture. Second, women's moral agency in relation to medical decisions 
is often not recognized. Third, courts apply evidentiary standards dif-
ferently to evidence about men's and women's preferences. Fourth, 
life-support dependent men are seen as subjected to medical assault; 
women are seen as vulnerable to medical neglect." 
Id. (quoting Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right 
to Die," 18 LAw iVIED. & HEALTH CARE 85, 87 (1989)); see also JOHN M. Sl\flTH, 
WOMEN AND DOCTORS 9 (1992) (observing that whether it is "unnecessary sur-
gery, inappropriate treatment or testing, lack of preventive care, lack of consid-
eration in research, allocation of dollars, or simply being milked for dollars by 
physicians, women[,]" regardless of their race, wealth, or career, are abused by 
doctors more often than similarly situated men); Law, supra note 1, at 295 
("[T]he tradition of medical paternalism is particularly strong in relation to 
women patients; doctors often assume authority to determine what is in 
women's best interest without soliciting their views."); Lisa Napoli, The Doc-
trine of Informed Consent and Women: The Achievement of Equal Value and 
Equal Exercise of Autonomy, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 335, 338-39 (1996) 
("Historically, e:l>.'Periments and operations have been performed on women 
without their consent. When consent is sought, women must often overcome 
gender-based stereotypes that impact on a doctor's decision to perform a proce-
dure .... "). See generazz,y Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263 JAMA 
2344 (1990) (discussing disparities in the treatment of blacks and whites); Gen-
der Disparities in Clinical Decision Making, 266 JAMA 559 (1991) (discussing 
disparities in the treatment of men and women). 
116. The literature is saturated with discussions on the moral aspects of 
helping people die. See Andrew Benton, Personal Autonomy and Physician As-
sisted Suicide: The Appropriate Response to a Modern Ethical Dilemma, 20 
Omo N.U. L. REv. 769, 778-86 (1994); Yale Kamisar, The Reasons So Many 
People Support Physician-Assisted Suicide-And Why These Reasons Are Not 
Convincing, 12 ISSUES L. MED. 113 (1996); Alan A. Stone, The Right to Die: New 
Problems for Law and Medicine and PSYchiatry, 37 EMORY L.J. 627 (1988); 
Eugenie Anne Gifford, Comment, Artes Moriendi: Active Euthanasia and the 
Art of Dying, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1554-58 (1993). 
117. See Orentlicher, supra note 98, at 1293; see also Bouvia v. Superior 
Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Ct. App. 1986). The court in Bouvia stated that: 
Id. 
Elizabeth Bouvia's decision to forego medical treatment or life-
support through a mechanical means belongs to her. It is not a medi-
cal decision for her physicians to make. Neither is it a legal question 
whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers or judges. It is not a 
conditional right subject to approval by ethics committees or courts of 
law. It is a moral and philosophical decision that, being a competent 
adult, is her's [sic] alone. 
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Thus, from the viewpoint of a patient, or the patient's family, 
the right to refuse medical treatment is easily ignored.us Broad ju-
dicial proclamations and state statutory protections have failed to 
guarantee patients an effective right to medical self-determination. 
II. AsSESSING THE F AlLURE TO REMEDY BREACHES OF PATIENTS' 
TREATMENT REFUSALS 
Because of the medical profession'S failure to honor consistently 
the right to refuse treatment, patients have been kept alive against 
their wishes. At the same time, however, it has been very difficult 
for patients to recover damages for the violation of that right. ll9 As 
noted earlier, a significant incentive for physician compliance with a 
patients' right to decisional autonomy has been the fear of litiga-
tion.120 Various forms of tort law, including battery, medical mal-
practice, and the doctrine of informed consent (rather than adminis-
trative enforcement), have been the favored methods of enforcing 
patient treatment decisions.121 
Although complaints alleging violation of the right to refuse 
treatment are in all other respects ordinary tort actions,122 they pose 
a problem with regard to the issues of injury and damages.123 Dam-
118. Realizing the difficulty of having a patients right to refuse treatment 
respected, some commentators have suggested some rather creative measures 
so that physicians will be unable to ignore the patients' request. See, e.g., 
Marian Haglund Juhl, A Tattoo in Time: I Want My Last Wish To Be Clearly 
Visible So It Will Be Honored by the Doctor Who Treats Me, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 13, 
1997, at 19, 19 (suggesting a DNR tattoo be placed on the body so that physi-
cians cannot ignore a patients' \vishes). 
119. See Gasner, supra note 15, at 499 (stating, in 1992, that to date, no fi-
nal monetary judgment had ever been awarded). 
120. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Oddi, supra 
note 35, at 634 (recognizing that physicians may be civilly or criminally liable if 
they withhold treatment); Rhoden, supra note 35, at 420, 422-23 (discussing 
how the fear of liability may effect medical decision-making). But cf. Hackle-
man, supra note 35, at 1362-63 (arguing that Ohio physicians disregard patient 
advance directives because Ohio law provides sanctions only when they act in 
bad faith and provides loopholes for those physicians who are prosecuted). 
121. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) 
(finding that the "notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the require-
ment that informed consent is generally required for medical treatment," and 
that informed consent is a component of American tort law). In his dissent, Jus-
tice Brennan remarked that the right "to determine what shall be done with 
one's own body" is grounded in American tort law. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). 
122. For a discussion of theories advanced in cases seeking damages for 
failure to honor a patient's refusal of treatment, see Gasner, supra note 15, at 
504-12, and Addlestone, supra note 15, at 1267-72. 
123. On the issue of damages, the plaintiff must allege that had the health 
care provided not been negligent nor \villful, the plaintiffs right to refuse 
treatment would have been respected and the plaintiff would have died. See 
Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 1996). 
Thus, the person's injury is in living. To conclude that a plaintiff suffered an 
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ages in tort actions for violating the right must be based on the 
premise-unacceptable to many courts-that in some circumstances 
death is preferable to life, and that a life continued warrants dam-
ages.124 A recent case demonstrates some of the difficulties that pa-
tients have in vindicating the right to refuse treatment. 
In Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital,125 the Ohio Su-
preme Court held that "there is no cause of action for 'wrongfulliv-
ing''' against a hospital for failure to follow a patient's DNR order.126 
In Anderson, Edward Winter, eighty-two, was admitted to the hos-
pital in 1988, complaining of chest pain.127 While in the hospital, 
Mr. Winter discussed the type of treatment he was to receive with 
his family doctor, Dr. Russo.128 Dr. Russo understood Mr. Winter to 
say that ''he wanted no extraordinary life-saving measures in the 
event of further illness.,,129 Despite the fact that Dr. Russo recorded 
"no code blue" on his chart,130 when Mr. Winter developed a poten-
tially fatal irregular heart rhythm a nurse revived him by using a 
cardiac defibrillator.131 Mr. Winter survived the ventricular fibrilla-
tion, but two days later suffered a stroke that left him permanently 
injury cognizable in tort, and to determine the measure of compensatory dam-
ages, the factfinder would have to compare the relative benefits of nonexistence 
to a life with disabilities. Courts have deemed this task impossible, refusing to 
make such calculations of injury (and the resulting valuations of life with and 
without disabilities), and thus have denied the availability of wrongful living 
suits to plaintiffs. See Hackleman, supra note 35, at 1369. 
124. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Colo. 1988) (en 
bane) (concluding that "life, however impaired and regardless of any attendant 
eA-penses, cannot rationally be said to be a detriment" when compared to the 
alternative of nonexistence); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 389 
(ill. 1983) (finding that human life cannot be a compensable harm, and stating 
that "the benefit of life should not be outweighed by the expense of supporting 
it"); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807,812 (N.Y. 1978) (finding courts une-
quipped to handle the task of comparing the value of life in an impaired state 
and nonexistence). 
125. 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996). 
126. Id. at 228. 
127. Id. 
128. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL 
109128, at ':'1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996). 
129. Id. During his conversation ,vith Dr. Russo, Mr. Winter was competent 
and alert. See id. In addition, Mr. Winter's daughter "told Dr. Russo how such 
[life-saving] measures had been given to Winter's wife, which resulted in great 
misery and suffering for the remainder of her life." Id. While she was in inten-
sive care, Mr. Winter's ,vife had "had her heart shocked and her chest beat and 
that Winter was very upset about those actions." Id. at *1 n.l. Winter subse-
quently told his daughter '''never to let anybody do that to him.'" Id. 
130. Id. at ':'1. In his deposition testimony, Dr. Russo defined a "no code 
blue" order as "an organized process of resuscitating a patient and anything 
that would initiate that or any procedure that would be, that would occur dur-
ing that process would be a resuscitative procedure, whether you whap them on 
the chest or whether you give medicine or whether you give an IV." Id. 
131. See id. 
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paralyzed on his right side.132 Mr. Winter incurred significant medi-
cal expenses for the constant medical attention that he required be-
fore his death nearly two years later.133 Mr. Winter's estate alleged 
battery, negligence, and wrongful living claims,134 asserting that by 
keeping Mr. Winter alive, the hospital caused him pain, suffering, 
emotional distress, disability, and medical damages, as well as 
other expenses.13S 
Chief Justice Moyer, writing for a majority of the Ohio Supreme 
Court, concluded from the facts that Mr. Winter had not suffered a 
compensable injury from the hospital's failure to follow his treat-
ment request.13G In his decision, Justice Moyer did not question Mr. 
Winter's right to make the treatment decision or his competency to 
do so. On the contrary, the court noted the constitutional signifi-
cance of his right to make such a decision.137 Justice Moyer stated: 
The plaintiff asserts a right to enforce an informed, competent 
decision to reject life-saving treatment. This claim is inextri-
cably linked to, and arises directly out of, the right to die rec-
ognized in Cruzan . ... Thus, in a "wrongful living" action, the 
plaintiff is asserting a liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment. It is the denial of this liberty interest, 
when the medical professional either negligently or intention-
ally disregards the express wishes of a patient, that gives rise 
to the wrongful living cause of action. 138 
The court, however, concluded that Ohio did not recognize a tort 
claim for wrongfulliving.139 Rather than examining Mr. Winter's 
132. See id. After his stroke, Mr. Winter, although aware of what was going 
on, "was unable to walk, was incontinent of urine, had difficulty speaking, and 
needed assistance in bathing and dressing." Id. 
133. See id. at *2. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio 
1996). 
137. See id. at 227 (noting that in a wrongful living action the plaintiff is as-
serting a constitutional liberty interest in refusing medical treatment). 
138. Id. 
139. See id. at 228. The wrongful living cause of action was first coined by 
A. Samuel Oddi. Oddi, supra note 35, at 637-43. The tort is essentially a bat-
tery or negligence claim associated with doctors who perform life-sustaining 
treatment against the \vishes of a patient. See id. at 644. The wrongful living 
claim should be distinguished from claims for wrongful life, wrongful birth, and 
wrongful pregnancy. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. 
A wrongful life claim is brought by a child seeking damages against a 
health care provider for negligently failing to inform the parents of a possible 
hereditary defect, see Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 955 (Cal. 1982) (en banc), 
or for failure to properly sterilize a parent, see Johnson v. University Hosp., 540 
N.E.2d 1370, 1372 (Ohio 1989). A wrongful birth claim is brought by parents of 
an impaired child. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 
441 (8th ed. 1998). Wrongful pregnancy deals specially with the failure of ei-
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autonomy interest, the court focused on the difficulty of determining 
damages under a wrongful living cause of action, stating that 
"[t]here is perhaps no issue that better demonstrates the outer 
bounds of liability in the American civil justice system than this is-
sue.,,140 
In determining if damages should be awarded for the life-
prolonging treatment, Justice Moyer stated that the issue presented 
was whether '''continued living' [is] a compensable injury.,,141 The 
court held that life is not a compensable injury/42 even if the plain-
tiff could show a breach of a duty resulting in prolongation of life.143 
The court noted that it had previously recognized the "'impossibility 
of a jury placing a price tag' on the benefit of life,,144 and concluded 
that: "There are some mistakes, indeed even breaches of duty or 
technical assaults, that people make in this life that affect the lives 
of others for which there simply should be no monetary compensa-
t . ,,145 IOn. 
ther a birth control method or a sterilization procedure that led to the birth of 
an unwanted, albeit healthy, child. See Johnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1372. 
140. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228 (noting that damages, if any, must be 
based on a theory of negligence or battery). In rejecting the wrongful living 
tort, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision to allow 
recovery for all foreseeable consequences of the treatment, including pain, suf-
fering, and emotional distress beyond that which Winter would have suffered 
had he not been resuscitated. See id. The difficulty in comparing death to a life 
with disabilities arises in the "wrongful life" suits as well. See Barry R. Fur-
row, Impaired Children and Tort Remedies: The Emergence of a Consensus, 11 
LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 148, 152 (1983); Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward 
Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Inju-
ries, Preconception Injures and Wro%aful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1456. 
141. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. In his concurring opinion, Justice Doug-
las stated: 
[If one] [a]ppl[ied] the positive connotation to an act which con-
tinues life, where death would have occurred without intervention, 
what damage could possibly ensue? 
... Assuming, for purposes of argument only, that the action of 
the hospital through its staff was negligence and, assuming further, 
that "damages" should be assessed as a result of the negligence, how 
could they be computed? Can the preservation oflife (furthering life) 
even be amenable to the "damages" concept. I think not! 
Id. at 229 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
142. See id. at 228. Overall, it appears that the court did not believe that 
Mr. Winter had suffered any cognizable injury from the wrongful resuscitation. 
143. See id. One could apply this reasoning to a person who interferes with 
the right to have an abortion. Indeed, in that case, the argument is stronger 
because the life saved is of one who did not assert a right to die. 
144. Id. (quoting Johnson, 540 N.E.2d at 1378). Even the court's language 
reflects complete disregard for patient choice; life is a "benefit," regardless of 
the patient's view of the matter. 
145. Id. For a critique of the view that an individual does not suffer harm 
by being kept alive against his will, see 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARM TO OTHERS 91 (1984), which argues that it is reason-
able to believe a person may be harmed by something even if he is unaware of 
it, like a man who does not know his wife is having an affair. 
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Justice Moyer then examined the possibility that Mr. Winter 
might have a claim based upon theories of negligence or battery.146 
He concluded, however, that causation was lacking for both a negli-
gence and a battery claim.147 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
applied an extremely narrow version of the ''but for" causation 
test,148 finding that the defibrillation did not cause Mr. Winter's 
subsequent stroke.149 Even though the record indicated that Mr. 
Winter would have died without resuscitation and that a stroke was 
a foreseeable event,150 the court held that "the record is devoid of 
any evidence that the administering of the resuscitative measures 
caused the stroke."l5l 
Not surprisingly, the court also narrowly interpreted the bat-
tery claim to provide compensatory damages only if the patient had 
suffered physical harm.152 Because Mr. Winter had suffered no 
physical damage due to defibrillation, "i.e., no tissue burns or bro-
ken bones,,,153 and because his estate had conceded that it was not 
seeking nominal damages,154 the court concluded that there was no 
issue for the trial court to decide on remand and entered judgment 
for the hospital.155 
146. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. 
147. See id. at 229. For a discussion of how courts will often confuse the 
concepts of valuation and causation in tort cases involving preexisting condi-
tions, see Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal 
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 
YALE L.J. 1353, 1353-64 (1981). 
148. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227. Under an ordinary tort analysis, applica-
tion of the "but for" test in a case where a doctor ignores a DNR order is 
straightforward. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the doctor's actions 
proximately caused the subsequent injury. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. 
George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL 109128, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 
1995) (holding that a patient is entitled to compensation for foreseeable injuries 
proximately caused by the unwanted medical treatment), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 
(Ohio 1996). The appropriate test should be that but for the resuscitation, the 
injury would not have occurred. Without intervention from the doctors, the pa-
tient would have died and would not have been subjected to the pain and loss of 
dignity associated ,vith her medical condition. See id. These conditions are 
foreseeable. 
149. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229. 
150. See id. at 228. 
151. Id. ("Winter suffered the stroke because the nurse enabled him to sur-
vive the ventricular tachycardia. Because the nurse prolonged Winter's life, 
numerous injuries occurring after resuscitation might be foreseeable, but would 
not be caused by the defibrillation."). 
152. See id. at 229. The court reasoned that Mr. Winter did not suffer a bat-
tery because any nonconsensual medical treatment the nurse performed was 
physically harmless. See id. The courts unduly narrow definition of harm re-
sults from its failure to find any harm from continued living. See id. at 228. 
153. Id. at 229. 
154. See id. 
155. See id. 
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In addressing whether the lack of a remedy would have a det-
rimental impact on the important right to refuse medical treatment, 
Justice Moyer noted that this decision should not encourage un-
wanted life-saving treatment: 
Where a patient clearly delimits the medical measures he or 
she is willing to undergo, and a health care provider disre-
gards such instructions, the consequences for that breach 
would include the damages arising from any battery inflicted 
on the patient, as well as appropriate licensing sanctions 
against the medical professionals. 156 
Three judges dissented and argued that Winter's estate should 
have been given an opportunity to prove that the hospital was neg-
ligent and that the health care providers violated Mr. Winter's con-
stitutional rights.157 The dissenters specifically argued that, 
"[c]ontrary to the assertion of the majority opinion, the plaintiff was 
not seeking to recover because Winter's life was prolonged. He was 
seeking to recover because the hospital staff failed to follow the in-
structions Winter had given them.,,158 Furthermore, the dissent 
noted that Mr. Winter's estate might be able to prove that the hos-
pital's negligence increased the likelihood that he would suffer a 
stroke,159 and that his estate had sufficient evidence to survive 
summary judgment.16o An expert witness had offered to testify that 
a stroke was immediately foreseeable if resuscitation occurred. 161 
Therefore, the dissent asserted, the majority incorrectly granted 
summary judgment in favor ofthe defendant hospital.162 
The Anderson court never explicitly questioned Winter's right 
to make the DNR decision or his competency to do so, nor did it ex-
amine the appropriateness of the hospital authorities' determina-
tions.16) Rather, the court focused on the difficulty or inappropri-
156. ld. at 229. Chief Justice Moyer apparently ignored the fact that under 
the Anderson holding, the court failed to provide any remedy. 
157. See id. at 230 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
158. ld. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
159. See id. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (noting that Mr. Winter's experts should 
have been given an opportunity to testify about causation because a factual 
dispute existed about what had caused his stroke). 
160. See id. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
161. See id. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) ("Medical experts were prepared to tes-
tify on behalf of [Mr. Winter's estate] that 'it was medically foreseeable that he 
[Mr. Winter] would suffer a stroke during the days immediately following defi-
brillation.'"). 
162. See id. (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
163. Indeed, the appellate court had specifically found that there could have 
been a violation of Mr. Winter's right and believed that, if such a violation was 
found, the only issue left to determine was whether the resuscitation caused his 
harm. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL 
109128, at :::3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996). 
The court stated, ''To be more precise, Edward Winter gave express directives 
for his medical care which were ignored, either negligently or intentionally. 
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ateness of assigning a dollar amount for this type of harm,l64 at least 
partly because of the view that life is always preferable to death. As 
a result, the court thus undermined Winter's fundamental right. 
Mr. Winter's case reveals the fatal flaw inherent in the right to 
refuse treatment. Anderson illustrates that failing to provide a 
remedy for the right to refuse medical treatment renders that right 
almost a complete nullity.165 If physicians are given the power to 
administer life-saving or life-sustaining medical care, despite a pa-
tient's express refusal of that treatment within an advance direc-
tive, then the physician could subject the individual to any number 
of various medical treatments without consent. 166 
The court's deference results from its failure to fullyacknowl-
edge the scope and importance of the individual autonomy interest 
involved.167 People make the decision to refuse or accept life-
sustaining medical treatment for many reasons. Some want to 
avoid the final agony of a terminal illness; others want to press on, 
despite pain or disability, for myriad reasons.168 Some people may 
have religious views for rejecting or accepting life-sustaining treat-
His right to refuse treatment was expressly violated." Id. The Ohio Supreme 
Court never disputed this finding. Rather, it reversed the appellate court based 
on its bizarre application of the causation rules to Mr. Winter's case, resulting 
in the plaintiffs failure to show any connection between the defibrillation and 
Winter's subsequent stroke. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228. 
164. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228. 
165. See Rhoden, supra note 35, at 430 (arguing that the judiciary's unre-
sponsiveness to wrongful living suits reflects "the legal system's uncritical en-
dorsement" of the medical profession and its reluctance to sanction the medical 
profession's interventionist instincts). 
166. Taking this argument to its logical end, an individual would have no 
cause of action even if the medical provider maliciously refused to withdraw 
treatment. Why should the law allow for such an abuse of medical authority on 
the sanctity of human life, particularly when the rest of society must account 
for similar conduct in other contexts, and may even be called on to support the 
individual's existence? The consequences of this argument are unreasonable. 
See, e.g., United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965) 
(holding that physicians could provide blood transfusions to a hospitalized pa-
tient who was refusing them on religious grounds and concluding that "[t]he 
patient may knmvingly decline treatment, but he may not demand mistreat-
ment"). 
It is hard to imagine a case in which a patient's refusal of medical treat-
ment that is necessary to save his life would not come within the court's defini-
tion of mistreatment. See SMITH, supra note 115, at 19 (noting that doctors 
have been granted tremendous power by society, including, perhaps, most im-
portantly, the power to control the "flow of information"). 
167. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
("[C]hoices central to personal dignity and autonomy ... [that] define one's own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life ... [also] define the attributes of personhood .... "); Michael H. v. Gerald 
n, 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that in our sys-
tem of government, "'liberty' must include the freedom not to conform"). 
168. See Rakowski, supra note 32, at 2094. 
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ment, or strong philosophical beliefs.169 Others reject life because of 
the conditions on which it is offered: either in chronic and uncon-
trolled pain, in helpless dependence on other people, or in other 
ways considered degrading.170 "Of course, people often have reasons 
other than self-interest for not wanting to live as long as 
[technologically] possible,,17l-they fear becoming an unnecessary 
burden on their family or friends, or perhaps they want to leave a 
larger estate.l72 Also present is some notion of dignity or self-
respect.173 "None of us," as Ronald Dworkin says, "wants to end our 
lives out of character.,,174 
Part of the courts' deference to physicians appears to stem from 
a misplaced appreciation of the strong incentives already· existing 
within the medical profession that support continued treatment of 
169. See id. 
170. See id. at 2094. Some of these fears, as noted above, are well justified. 
Physicians do ignore the documented wishes of patients and all too often allow 
patients to live with uncontrolled pain. See A Controlled Trial to Improve Care 
for Seriously III Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and 
Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 
1591, 1591-92 (1995). Studies of cancer patients have shown that over 50% suf-
fer from unrelieved pain. See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND LAw, 
WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: AsSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL 
CONTEXT at x-xi (1994). The New York Task Force also reports that "[d]espite 
dramatic advances in pain management, the delivery of pain relief is grossly 
inadequate in clinical practice .... Studies have shown that only 20 to 60 per-
cent of cancer pain, is treated adequately." Id. at 43. 
171. Rakowsld, supra note 32, at 2094. 
172. See id. at 2094-95; see also Gasner, supra note 15, at 514 (''Permitting 
payment for unwanted treatment provides a serious disincentive to honor pa-
tient choice. . . . If the provider is allowed to treat now, and decide later 
whether it was appropriate, and get paid in the interim, there is little incentive 
to expedite the court proceedings."). 
173. See Rakowsld, supra note 32, at 2095. Professor Meisel makes the 
point that the proclivity of the courts in treatment refusal cases to assert the 
state interest in an adversarial fashion against the liberty interest of the indi-
vidual erroneously suggests that the state has no concern for the autonomy, 
self-determination, privacy, and bodily integrity of its citizens. 2 MEISEL, supra 
note 7, § 8.14, at 502. Personal dignity is a part of one's right of privacy. The 
right of bodily privacy led the United States Supreme Court to hold that it 
shocked its conscience to learn that a state, even temporarily, had put a tube 
into the stomach of a criminal defendant to recover swallowed narcotics. See 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
174. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 213. Dworldn observes: 
Decisions about life and death are the most important, the most cru-
cial for forming and expressing personality, that anyone makes; we 
think it crucial to get these decisions right, but also crucial to make 
them in character, and for ourselves. Even people who want to im-
pose their convictions on everyone else through the criminal law, 
when they and like-minded colleagues are politically powerful, would 
be horrified, perhaps to the point of revolution, if their political for-
tunes were reversed and they faced losing the freedom they are now 
ready to deny others. 
Id. at 239. 
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the patient.175 There is also the courts' discomfort with punishing a 
physician for saving a life.176 However, an unbalanced inquiry that 
heeds only the rights of the medical profession does great harm to 
patient autonomy interests. Because health care for end~of~life 
treatment is expensive,177 claimants have tried to refuse payment to 
nursing homes and hospitals when health care providers have ig~ 
nored their right to refuse treatment and thus have subsequently 
accrued large medical bills.178 As in Anderson, these claims have not 
been successful.179 Monetary considerations/so current statutes, and 
case law do not supply incentives for hospitals and doctors to pro~ 
175. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text; see also Danis et aI., 
supra note 13, at 884 (noting six instances where patients received more ag-
gressive care than requested); Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the 
Context of Managed Care, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 455, 460-66 (1996) (reviewing the fi-
nancial incentives for physicians to overtreat patients). 
176. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 
(Ohio 1996) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Short of ignoring a living will or a dura-
ble power of attorney for health care, medical professionals should not be sub-
jected to liability for carrying out the very mission for which they have been 
trained and for which they have taken an oath." (citations omitted». 
177. See generally Katharine R. Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 
1993, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 247 (1994) (providing data on health care ex~ 
penditures in the United States and noting, in particular, the high cost of end-
of-life care). 
178. See, e.g., Grace Plaza, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (App. Div. 
1992). In Grace Plaza, a long-term care facility admitted Jean Elbaum in Sep-
tember, 1986, follo\ving hospital treatment for a stroke. Id. at 855. Approxi-
mately one year later, Mr. Elbaum informed Grace Plaza that his wife did not 
want to live in her present state and he demanded her feeding tube be with~ 
drawn. See id. When Grace Plaza refused Mr. Elbaum's request, he stopped 
paying and Grace Plaza sued to recover payment for services it had rendered to 
Mrs. Elbaum. See id. In holding that Grace Plaza could recover, the court ac-
knowledged that, "in light of our decision today, all health care providers in 
charge of competent patients will have an additional financial incentive to pro-
long the lives of such patients over the objections of the patients' families." Id. 
at 860. The court then stated: 
Id. 
This may be true, and the potential evil which we see is that some 
beleaguered families may, regrettably, be forced to litigation . . . . 
What is not noted is that, if Mr. Elbaum's conduct in this case were 
condoned, health care providers would have an additional financial 
incentive to obey, without question, the orders of those conservators 
who might prematurely despair of their conservatee's recovery, or the 
orders of those conservators whose judgment might be tainted by mo-
tives less altruistic than Mr. Elbaum's. The potential evil we see re-
sulting from this, i.e., the possible death of even one patient whose 
life might have been saved, is infinitely greater, in our view. 
179. See Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228; see also Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 
860. 
180. See Gilbert, supra note 10, at Al (quoting Dr. Bernard Lo, director of 
the program of medical ethics at the University of California at San Francisco, 
as stating that doctors have strong financial incentive to put patients in inten-
sive care rather than talk with them about alternatives.) 
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vide appropriate care to a patient who chooses to refuse medical 
treatment. lSI As one dissenting judge put it, such rulings "allow[ ] a 
nursing home to profit financially, while ignoring a patient's wishes, 
as it imposes its own ethical standards upon her.,,182 
To be sure, some judges have indicated dissatisfaction with the 
lack of protection accorded the right to refuse treatment.183 These 
jurists, however, are in the minority.184 In most post-Cruzan deci-
sions, courts, by denying a remedy, have effectively expanded the 
discretion of hospital authorities to ignore the patient's right to ref-
use medical treatment. At least arguably, these decisions have re-
duced the right to refuse treatment to a mere catch-phrase. 
III. BEYOND THE CURRENT LAw: A NEW APPROACH 
The prevailing judicial attitude does not adequately protect the 
right to refuse medical treatment. A new approach is necessary to 
ensure that in balancing the competing interests that underlie this 
dilemma, more respect is accorded the patient's autonomy interests. 
A. Autonomy Rights and Misguided Paternalism 
Notably absent from current jurisprudence in this area is the 
notion that protecting a patient's autonomy serves important social 
and civic values. Autonomy is firmly grounded in the Constitution's 
181. See Wolf, supra note 175, at 457-58 (discussing how some commenta-
tors have remarked on the potential problems caused by the current system, 
which favors treatment over nontreatment); see also Don Colburn, The Grace of 
a "Good Death" Escapes Many; Despite Living Wills and Other Innovations, Doc-
tors Often Ignore or Don't Know Patients' Wishes, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1995, at 
Z7 (quoting Joanne Lynne, director of the Center to Improve Care of the Dying, 
stating that one of the problems with the current system is that "it doesn't hold 
itself accountable for badly handled deaths. 'If I, as a doctor, do it badly, noth-
ing comes down on me .... I get paid well. The family is left behind in grief 
and goes away. The patient's suffering counts for nothing.'"). 
182. Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 862 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) 
(e}"'Pressing great concern that Grace Plaza had '''ignored Mr. Elbaum's de-
mands while simultaneously insisting upon payment for their undesired serv-
ices.'" (quoting Elbaum v. Grace Plaza, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847 (App. Div. 
1989»)). 
183. See, e.g., id. at 868 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) ("The advancement of 
professional ethics to support the preservation of life has epitomized the medi-
cal profession, to the public benefit. However powerful those interests may be, 
they should not serve as a platform to afford compensation for unwanted serv-
ices, rendered adversely to the patient's declared right to autonomy."); Ander-
son, 671 N.E.2d at 230 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (noting that the patient's ad-
ministrator should have been allowed to show that the hospital failed to follow 
the patient's instructions with regard to his medical care). 
184. In case law, it is the dissenting judges who have indicated dissatisfac-
tion with the lack of protection accorded patients who refuse treatment. See, 
e.g., Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting); Anderson, 
671 N.E.2d at 230 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
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protection of individual liberty. ISS The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the Constitution to provide protection for liberty interests 
ranging from freedom of conscience and religion,186 to autonomy in 
decisions affecting marriage, reproduction, and the raising of chil-
dren.187 The Court extrapolated from these liberty and autonomy 
interests to support a constitutional right to withdraw life sup-
rt 188 po . 
Judicial decisions involving the right to refuse medical treat-
ment do not demonstrate respect for individual autonomy. 189 
Rather, the decisions reflect a misguided paternalism on the part of 
judges to allow doctors to extend life under almost any circum-
stances. Unfortunately, this view holds that the medical profes-
sional knows better than the patient, what is really in the patient's 
185. The Supreme Court has frequently employed autonomy in constitu-
tionaljurisprudence. For example, it recognized the autonomy of the individual 
to choose the editorial content of publications in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 
178 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring), to represent themselves in court in Faretta 
v. California, 422 U.S 806, 817 (1975), and to control unwanted mail in Rowan 
v. United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970). In all these 
instances, the Court could have substituted liberty for autonomy without al-
tering the import of these rights. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court 
also used liberty and autonomy indistinguishably, claiming "[t]he woman's con-
stitutional liberty interest also involves her freedom to decide matters of the 
highest privacy and the most personal nature," and "[d]ecisional autonomy 
must limit the State's power to inject into a woman's most personal delibera-
tions its own view of what is best." 505 U.S. 833, 915-16 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
In constitutional jurisprudence, both liberty and autonomy protect a 
woman's right to make important personal decisions for herself. See id. at 920 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, the Court has 
identified autonomy with liberty for many decades, and recently has employed 
it to ground important personal rights. 
186. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985) (reaffirming that in-
dividual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the 
right to select any religious faith or none at all); West Virginia State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that requiring school chil-
dren to salute the flag "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit" protected by 
the First Amendment). 
187. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (privileging 
"matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) 
(protecting the right of parents "to direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) 
(defining liberty to include the right to choose an occupation to "acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry," and to raise children). 
188. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[AJ protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions and ... the refusal 
of artificially delivered food and water is encompassed within that liberty inter-
est."). 
189. See supra Part II. 
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best interest.19o Perhaps because the stakes are so high, the gov-
ernment intervenes on the side of the medical professional to ensure 
that the individual does not make a horrible mistake. 
This Article maintains that the medical profession should not 
be trusted to make these fundamental choices for individuals.I91 
The medical provider is not any wiser or more knowledgeable about 
how a person chooses to exercise fundamental liberties than the 
person him or herself.192 Likewise, the government, including the 
judiciary, should not automatically side with the doctor when mak-
ing a determination in the right to die cases. Even though the leg-
islatures and courts are often inept at determining what is truly in 
a person's best interest,I93 they should not rely solely on the medical 
profession to make that determination. There is a natural tendency 
to belittle the costs we inflict on others in pursuing our values or in-
terests. As Rochefoucauld warned, "[w]e are all strong enough to 
endure the misfortunes of others.,,194 Permitting the medical profes-
sion to dictate decisions about fundamental liberty interests for the 
majority of citizens violates individual autonomy.I9S 
Moreover, because the right to refuse medical treatment is such 
a deeply personal choice that implicates each person's philosophical 
or religious views on life and death,I96 medical providers should not 
190. See, e.g., Grace Plaza, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853,861-64 (App. 
Div. 1992) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (reasoning that in maintaining medical 
treatment, Grace Plaza was not acting out of fear of liability because the pa-
tient's wishes were unclear; rather, it was imposing its own ethical beliefs on 
the patient). 
191. As Justice Brandeis observed: ''Experience should teach us to be most 
on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are benefi-
cent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men 
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
192. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 838, 920 (1992) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (''Part of the constitu-
tionalliberty to choose is the equal dignity to which each of us is entitled."). 
193. For example, the Court has upheld cases in which the judiciary has de-
nied certain autonomy and moral choices to individuals. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state-forced sterilization); Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the separate but equal doctrine), overruled by 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) 393 (1856) (invalidating the congressional act freeing slaves in cer-
tain territories), superseded by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV. 
194. DUKE DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, THE MA.,"{IMS OF THE DUKE DE LA 
ROCHEFOUCAULD 'lI19, at 35 (Constitutine FitzGibbon trans. 1957). 
195. See Philip G. Peters, The Illusion of Autonomy at the End of Life: Un-
consented Life Support and the Wrongful Life Analogy, 45 UCLA L. REV. 673, 
693 (1998) ("When unconsented care is administered, the patient, not the court, 
suffers the agony of prolonged death, the impoverishment of further medical 
and support expenses, and the frustration and indignity oflingering beyond her 
time and burdening her family."). 
196. See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 215 (noting that the idea that ''human 
life is sacred or inviolable is both more complex, and open to different and com-
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interfere and attempt to impose their own view regarding life's ab-
solute sanctity. 197 Again, the courts must uphold the patients' 
autonomy interests in cases in which doctors have ignored their 
wishes. Instead, the courts have acted to uphold the values and 
viewpoints of the medical profession.19B Under the Constitution, 
transient majorities may not impose their own moral choices on 
others, absent a compelling governmental reason for doing so, if the 
legislation implicates a fundamental liberty interest.199 The Found-
ers believed that government should not define popular morality or 
displace the citizenry's ability to make moral decisions.20o Indeed, 
the belief was that individuals would become better citizens if they 
had the freedom to make difficult moral choices about how to live 
their lives.201 As Professor Martin Diamond suggests, the Founders 
peting interpretations"); see also BEAUCHAMP & CmLDREsS, supra note 38, at 
157 ("Any attempt to make life-understood as a set of vital logical processes-
unconditionally good in itself is a 'vitalism' that should be rejected in favor of a 
view that life is only conditionally good."). As another commentator has aptly 
recognized: 
[L]ife is not merely a matter of being alive in some purely biological or 
bio-physical sense of the term. Something can be alive or be capable 
of life in the latter sense, yet not alive or capable of life in the sense 
implied in or by the expressions mentioned above .... [AJ full life 
... is one full of significant experience and activity, and we apply it in 
the first instance only to human beings. 
Henry David Aiken, Life and Right to Life, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN 
GENETICS 173, 173 (Bruce Hilton et al. eds., 1973). 
197. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 ("[T]he most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that "[i]n a community such as ours, 'liberty' must include the freedom 
not to conform"). 
198. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. 
199. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, 
not to mandate our own moral code."). 
200. See Richard Hofstadter, The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism, in 
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 73, 76 (Robert H. Horwitz 
ed. 1977) ("One thing that the Fathers did not propose to do, because they 
thought it impossible, was to change the nature of man to conform with a more 
ideal system."); Kimberly Sharron Dunn, Note, The Prize and the Price of Indi-
uidual Agency: Another Perspectiue on Abortion and Liberal Gouernment, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 81, 88 (noting that the original 13 colonies rejected the Aristolean 
view of government and based the legitimacy of their revolution on a belief 
taken from John Locke's political philosophy that "when political power inap-
propriately intrudes on individual liberty the people have the right to abolish 
it"). For another discussion of the necessary role of the state in making people 
more autonomous, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiuing Autonomy: Sources, 
Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989). 
201. See RUTH W. GRANT, JOHN LOCKE'S LmERALISIII 194 (1987) ("And to be 
truly free, he must be guided by his own reason. It is not enough to do the rea-
sonable thing. A man must have reached the conclusion on his own that it is 
the reasonable thing to do."); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 3-19 (Currin V. 
Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956) (1859) (distinguishing between moral and 
political power in the project of making human beings good, and carving out a 
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were confident that at least among some people, "the full range of 
the higher human virtues would have suitable opportunity to flour-
ish ... from religion, education, family upbringing, and simply out 
of the natural yearnings of human nature" but not by use of the 
law.202 Thus, the government generally should remain neutral to 
competing views ofthe good or ofmorality.203 
The pluralism of American society provides a third argument 
against government paternalism.204 Because of the differing beliefs 
that underlie each person's value system, it is essential that an in-
dividual's choice be respected.205 Decisions about when to die, just 
large domain of individual liberty that should not be disturbed by coercion or 
moral condemnation); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 
(1990) ("We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to many 
.... [But p]unishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that 
makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering."); Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 419 (1989) (''The way to preserve the flag's special role is not to pun-
ish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that 
they are wrong."). 
202. Martin Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in THE 
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 200, at 39, 71; see 
also H.L..A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 58 (1963) ("[W]hat is valuable 
here [in the domain of morality] is voluntary restraint, not submission to coer-
cion, which seems quite empty of moral value."). There is very little evidence to 
support the idea that morality is best taught by fear of legal punishment. Mo-
rality is certainly taught and sustained ,vithout legal punishment, and where 
morality is taught ,vith it, there is the standing danger that fear of punishment 
may remain the sole motive for conformity. 
203. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191 (1985) ("[E]quality 
supposes that political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of 
any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life. . . . 
[T]he government does not treat [citizens] as equals if it prefers one conception 
to another .... "); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALIS~1 191-94 (1993) (defining 
the necessity of neutrality much more vigorously than Dworkin, as well as, of-
fering a more philosophical understanding ofneutraIity). 
204. See James Madison, Debates (June 12, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 
328, 330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., William S. Hien & Co., 2d ed. 1996) (1891) 
("[T]he utmost freedom. . . arises from that multiplicity of sects which per-
vades America, . . . for where there is such a variety of sects, there cannot be a 
majority of anyone sect to oppress and persecute the rest."). Other writers 
have added that the maintenance of multiple faiths is the best protection of the 
core guarantee of liberty of conscience. See, e.g., ELISHA WILLIAMS, THE Es-
SENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS: A SEASONABLE PLEA FOR THE 
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGl\IENT, IN MATTERS OF 
RELIGION, WITHOUT ANY CONTROUL FROM HUMAN AUTHORITY 7 (n.p. 1744). 
205. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 32 (James Madison) (John P. Ka-
minski & Richard Leffler eds., Madison House 1989). Madison stated that in a 
federalist republic: 
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame ,vithin their par-
ticular States, but ,viII be unable to spread a general conflagration 
through the other States: a religious sect, may degenerate into a po-
litical faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects 
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as surely as decisions about conception,206 should often reside out-
side the domain of majoritarian legislative bodies. 
Although medical professionals may have legitimate reasons for 
rejecting a patient's decision to refuse medical treatment, this does 
not justify abandoning the values and principles articulated in Cru-
zan207 and Casey.208 The medical profession should not be permitted 
to act with impunity.209 Doctors and other care-givers should recog-
nize that patients have the right to exercise choice in these matters, 
and the courts should ensure that health care professionals respect 
patients' values and preferences when making treatment deci-
sions.210 
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the paternalistic approach 
reflected in the Anderson decision, a deferential approach towards 
physicians has some support in the academic community. A num-
ber of scholars have argued that medical doctors must be given wide 
latitude in their administration of a patient's care.211 They argue 
that medical professionals are in the best position to judge what 
care patients should receive and, therefore, should not be overly in-
hibited in exercising their discretion.212 Defenders of the status quo 
ld. 
dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national Councils 
against any danger from that source .... 
206. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reI. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) 
(holding that the Constitution forbids a state from sterilizing certain criminals 
not only because the proposed punishment would do "irreparable injury" to 
bodily integrity, but because "[m]arriage and procreation" concern "the basic 
civil rights of man"). 
207. 497 U.S 261 (1990); see supra Part LA. 
208. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 
1047, 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (stating that carrying deference to a physi-
cian's best medical judgment to its extreme "could effectively nullify those pri-
vacy rights recognized in In re Quinlan," and permit a "physician [to] circum-
vent the express wishes of a terminal patient by waiting to act until the patient 
was comatose and critical"). But see Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 
575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that moral opposition to nudity sup-
plies a rational basis for permitting a state to prohibit it). 
209. See Grace Plaza, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 860-61 (App. Div. 
1992) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) ("Grace Plaza is on record as having dis-
counted utterly the patient's wishes to die naturally, proclaiming itself to be the 
transcendent arbiter of the patient's artificial life support."). 
210. Obviously, just as medical professionals should not be allowed to com-
pletely discount a patient's decision to accept or refuse medical treatment, not 
all patient decisions should automatically receive protection from the courts. 
For example, if a provider insists on treatment because the patient might get 
better and the patient or the patient's family objects with no basis, this might 
present a circumstance when a physician might be permitted to displace the 
patient or his or her family as decision-maker. Instead, each patient's situation 
should be evaluated on a fact-specific basis, providing balanced protection for 
patient wishes. 
211. See Milani, supra note 97, at 168 & n.85 (citing scholars who suggest 
that physicians are in the best position to make decisions for patients). 
212. See id. 
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may argue that cases like Anderson provide needed flexibility to 
health professionals, allowing them to best determine what care the 
patient should receive.213 
On the other hand, several academicians have questioned the 
minimal protection accorded to patients under the current test and 
have put forth a variety of proposals for reform. Some commenta-
tors have advocated providing patients with new common law ac-
tions.214 Others have suggested that legislative action may be the 
only hope for increased protection of patient autonomy.215 
213. See id. 
214. See generally Gasner, supra note 15 (arguing for the need for a tort 
remedy to impose financial penalties for the failure to respect a patient's right 
to refuse treatment); Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 35 (arguing for a need for 
a legal remedy if a patient's right to refuse treatment is violated); Milani, supra 
note 97, at 223 n.348 (1997) (interpreting Willard Pedrick as "suggesting that 
the use of tort principles will be more successful in assuring the right to die 
than the enactment of statutes"); Miller, supra note 15 (arguing that courts 
must give broader recognition to right-to-die damage actions); Oddi, supra note 
35 (arguing for the need for a wrongful living tort to permit compensation for 
violations of the right to refuse treatment); Willard H. Pedrick, Dignified Death 
and the Law of Torts, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 387, 390 (1991) (noting that the 
"familiar principles of tort law can be enlisted to better assure that unwanted 
life support measures either will not be used, or will be ,vithdrawn when that is 
the ,vish of the patient or the patient's agent"); Peters, supra note 195, at 731 
(arguing that a right to compensatory damages will foster respect for patients' 
wishes); Addlestone, supra note 15, at 1267-72 (noting that "[a]s a matter of 
common sense, noncompliance with a patient's ,vishes should give rise to some 
type of liability"); Richard P. Dooling, Comment, Damage Actions for Noncon-
sensual Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 895 (1986) 
(arguing that a physician or hospital that fails to respect a patient's right to die 
should be liable in damages); Hackleman, supra note 35 (noting the need for a 
wrongful living cause of action if a patient's right to die is violated). 
215. Several commentators have suggested that the Patient Self-
Determination Act ("PSDA") might give rise to a cause of action when a hospi-
tal fails to inform a patient of his rights under state law or of its policy regard-
ing the removal of life support. See Gasner, supra note 15, at 518; Addlestone, 
supra note 15, at 1278-79. But see Mulholland, supra note 96, at 627 n.81 
(1991) (arguing that by delegating to health care providers the role of informa-
tion distributor, and not information advocate, the PSDA eliminates the possi-
bility of malpractice suits). 
The only case to date on the issue, however, held that the PSDA does not 
include a private right of action. See Asselin v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., 
894 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (D. Kan. 1995). Some states classify the failure of a 
health care provider to comply with an advance directive, and to transfer a pa-
tient to a facility where treatment will be ,vithdrawn, as a criminal misde-
meanor, but such a failure must be willful or in bad faith. See, e.g., ARK. CODE 
.ANN. § 20-17-209(a) (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(a) 
(Deering 1998); MONT. CODE.ANN. § 50-9-206(1) (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-
411(1) (1997); NEV. REV. STAT . .ANN. § 449.660(1) (lVlichie 1996). Other states 
classify the failure to comply with a directive as unprofessional conduct, allow-
ing state licenSing authorities to penalize a health care provider. See, e.g., D.C. 
CODE.ANN. § 6-2427(b) (1995); HAw. REv. STAT. § 327D-11(c) (1993); Mo . .ANN. 
STAT. § 459.045(1) (West 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-78(a) (West 1996); 
OKLA. STAT . .ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.11(a) (West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.11-
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Many of these scholars have noted that fear of civil or criminal 
actions for suspending treatment provides a strong incentive for 
health care providers to resuscitate patients at all costS.21G Theyar-
gue that a similar fear of legal liability for unwanted treatment 
might counterbalance this effect because the only legally prudent 
thing to do would be to act in good faith, consistent with the pa-
tient's wishes, and in accordance with good medical practice.217 
Thus, they assert that courts and legislatures should provide 
greater protection for the individual autonomy interest.21S 
B. Resuscitating the Right to Refuse Treatment 
Plaintiffs bringing actions for a violation of the right to refuse 
treatment have relied on a plethora of theories, ranging from inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress to constitutional violations.219 
9(a) (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-100 (West 1976 & Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (1984 & Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112(3) 
(1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(1)(a)(3) (West 1997). 
216. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision 
Making for the Terminally III Incompetent, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 367, 386 nA8 
(1979). A few living will statutes expressly provide the basis for a civil cause of 
action, but either limit the damages available or require that the health care 
provider's refusal to follow the advance directive be in bad faith. See ALAsKA 
STAT. § 18.12.070(a) (Michie 1994) (allowing "civil penalty not to exceed $1000 
plus the actual costs associated with the failure to comply with the order or 
declaration, and this shall be the exclusive remedy at law"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 
20-402(1) (1997) (''Unjustifiable violation of a patient's direction shall be a civil 
cause of action maintainable by the patient or the patient's next of kin. Rem-
edy in law and equity may be granted by a court of competent jurisdiction."); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108(a) (1984 & Supp. 1997) ("Any health care pro-
vider who fails to make good faith reasonable efforts to comply with the pre-
ceding procedure as prescribed by the attending physician shall be civilly liable 
and subject to professional disciplinary action .... "). 
Additionally, section 10 of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act 
("UHCDA") includes a provision on "statutory damages." UNIF. HEALTH-CARE 
DECISIONS ACT § 10, 9 U.L..A. 309 (1988 & Supp. 1998). Damages are available 
only for an intentional violation of the act and can range from $500 to "actual 
damages resulting from the violation, whichever is greater, plus reasonable at-
torney's fees." Id. § 10(a). A comment to the section indicates that the drafters 
chose civil damages rather than criminal penalties "out of a recognition that 
prosecutions are unlikely to occur." Id. § 10 cmt. It also indicates that the 
statutory damages "do not supersede but are in addition to remedies available 
under other law." Id. 
217. See Annas, supra note 216, at 386 nA8. 
218. See id. 
219. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1530-31 (D. 
Colo. 1987) (claiming civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a pri-
vate cause of action under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Bouvia v. 
County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239 (Ct. App. 1987) (claiming violation of 
civil rights); Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (pleading five damage theories including battery, violation of state 
and federal constitutional rights, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress and conspiracy); McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 524 
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Despite this, few complaints have been successful.220 It appears that 
the COurtS,221 and not existing tort law,222 have been the principal 
roadblock to recovery. Courts have been reluctant to extend exist-
ing tort principles from other cases to this area.223 Although many 
decisions acknowledge the existence of these principles, courts have 
not generally applied them in the same fashion as they would in 
other personal injury cases.224 This has occurred because the courts 
A.2d 450, 452 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (claiming negligent infliction of 
emotional distress). 
A discussion of the § 1983 cause of action in the context of refusal of 
treatment is outside the scope of this Article, but can be found in SHELDON H. 
NAHMOD, CML RIGHTS AND CIVIL LmERTlEs LITIGATION: THE LAw OF SECTION 
1983, 156-57 (3d ed. 1991). 
220. See Gasner, supra note 15, at 499 (noting that no reported cases exist 
in which damages have been awarded for the unwanted imposition of life-sus-
taining treatment). 
221. Nancy Rhoden argues that the courts have adopted the medical pre-
sumption of continued treatment: "Although it may seem like folly to question 
the near-sacrosanct medical and legal injunction to 'err on the side of life,' 
... the medical presumption for treatment incorporates not only the overt and 
noble commitment to saving life, but also covert and highly questionable psy-
chological, technological, and professional drives." Rhoden, supra note 35, at 
420. Rhoden describes the professional self-concept of physicians: ''Persons in-
tensively socialized to be decisive, action-oriented healers may find it e},.'ttaor-
dinarily difficult to refrain from taking action." Id. at 421. 
Further, with the increased availability of technology that can have some 
effect, the medical ethic more than ever includes an attitude that "it is always 
better to over-diagnose and over-treat than to fail to intervene." Id. This sen-
timent, in turn, is supported by faith in medical power and fear of litigation. 
See id. at 422-23. Therefore, the impact of technology itself on the practice of 
medicine breeds a technological imperative. See id. at 423-27; see also Daniel 
Callahan, Can We Return Death to Disease?, 19 HAsTINGS CENTER REp. supp. at 
4 (1989) ("We will need a dampening of the push for medical progress, a return 
to older traditions of caring as an alternative to curing, and a willingness to ac-
cept decline and death as part of the human condition (not a notable feature of 
American medicine)."). 
222. See Peters, supra note 195, at 675 (arguing that a doctrinal difficulty 
exists for courts adopting the wrongful living tort due to the development and 
rejection of the prenatal tort remedy, wrongful life). But see, Hackleman, supra 
note 35, at 1359 (arguing that wrongful life tort provides support for the further 
development and adoption of the wrongful living tort). 
223. See, e.g., Grace Plaza, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 860-61 (App. 
Div. 1992) (Rosenblatt, J., dissenting) (stating that Grace Plaza completely ig-
nored the patient's wishes, believing that it knew what was best for the pa-
tient). While courts have failed to provide a remedy, they have not been en-
tirely forthcoming as to why the plaintiff does not deserve a recovery. Instead, 
as noted above, the courts manipulate tort principles so that it appears the 
plaintiff has no legal case. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. For a 
discussion of a judge's duty to make the reasoning behind his or her decisions 
and assumptions in those decisions explicit, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist 
Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 862-63 (1990). 
224. For example, in Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, 671 
N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio 1996), the court applied an incorrect causation analysis 
in order to find that the hospital's defibrillation did not cause Mr. Winter's in-
jury. See supra notes 148-55 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1078 1998
1078 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
have discounted patients' right to refuse treatment225 and have 
failed to find harm when the patients remain alive.226 The courts' 
timidity effectively renders the right to refuse treatment a nullity. 
To be sure, potential liability acts as a strong incentive for the 
medical profession to respect an individual patient's autonomy 
rights. Perhaps new theories, such as the wrongful living tort,2~7 
will be used to vindicate patients for the violation of this right. Like 
its predecessors, however, a new tort theory will do nothing if courts 
are not willing to implement fully the tort principles that already 
exist in the medical area. 
As noted above, courts appear to take questionable positions 
concerning the autonomy interest involved and the power of the 
medical profession.228 Some courts may object to remedying a denial 
of the right to refuse treatment based on a religious belief that life is 
the gift of a higher power, and thus individuals have no right to dis-
pose oftheir lives.229 In addition, courts may be reluctant to provide 
a remedy when they are unsure that the individual properly exer-
cised the right to refuse treatment.230 This last concern, however, 
confuses the required procedural protections that may be necessary 
to protect all patients from overly cost-conscious health care provid-
225. See, e.g., Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 861-64 (Rosenblatt, J., dissent-
ing) (reasoning that in maintaining medical treatment, Grace Plaza was not 
acting out of fear of liability because the patient's wishes were unclear; rather, 
it was imposing its own ethical beliefs on the patient). 
226. See, e.g., Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229 (holding that the prolongation of 
life cannot be a legal detriment). 
227. For commentators who argue for the acceptance of a wrongful living 
cause of action, see, for example, Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 35, at 261-63, 
Oddi, supra note 35, and Hackleman, supra note 35. 
228. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text. 
229. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GoVERNMENT 375 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690) (arguing that the will of God is the preser-
vation of mankind and that human sanctions are not valid against this); PAUL 
RAMsEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERSECTIONS 146 
(1978) (characterizing life as a gift from God, a perception based on the Judeo-
Christian heritage that has influenced medicine toward a pro-life stance, and 
that choosing any course of action or inaction that results in death would be to 
throw the gift of life back in the face of the giver). But see Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 563-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (asserting that a state's religious reasons for a law are 
inappropriate considerations). 
230. Courts have legitimate fears that some patients might be killed against 
their \vishes or that some patients might be coerced into consenting to the re-
moval of care. See Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact of Physician-
Assisted Suicide Cases, 82 MlNN L. REV. 895, 906 (1998) (citing Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-92 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring)). 
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ers231 with the legal remedy that should be provided to any patient 
who properly exercises her right and is ignored. 
1. The protection offundamentalliberties 
A review of other fundamental rights shows that courts have 
upheld the protection of individual liberties and autonomy rights, 
even when they disagree with how the individual exercises those 
rights or see potentially harmful consequences following such an 
exercise.232 For example, imagine the case of a woman who goes to 
her doctor and requests an abortion. If the doctor, because of a 
moral objection to abortion, deceived the woman into believing that 
an abortion would endanger her life, surely the woman would have 
a cause of action for malpractice or fraud.233 This would be true 
even though the doctor may have been right in the sense that, after 
the fact, the new mother proves to be quite happy to have the child. 
In the abortion context, the physician is not permitted to overrule a 
patient's decision, even if the physician feels the patient's decision 
. all 234 IS mor y wrong. 
The right to vote belongs to all individuals.235 An individual can 
vote for whomever he or she pleases, even if a person votes for a 
candidate who objectively does not appear to serve his or her best 
interests.236 Similarly, we protect freedom of speech even though it 
231. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (upholding the imposition of a clear and 
convincing evidence standard as a legitimate procedural protection on the right 
to refuse medical treatment). 
232. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("We cannot lose 
sight of the fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying in-
stance of individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal 
values are truly implicated."). 
233. See, e.g., McCandless v. State, 162 N.Y.S.2d 570, 575-76 (App. Div. 
1957) (awarding $2000 in damages for an abortion performed on mental patient 
,vithout her consent, though pain was less than labor would have been and 
mental condition was improved as a result of abortion). 
234. See Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant 
Women: "Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest", 37 HAsTINGS L.J. 
703, 724 (1986); Nancy K Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emer-
gence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1990-94 (1986). 
235. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (recognizing the right to 
vote as fundamental and as one of those rights that is "preservative of other ba-
sic civil and political rights"); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919) 
(holding that the right to vote "is so valuable that damages are presumed from 
the wrongful deprivation of it"). 
236. For example, suppose that Kathleen Willey, a women who has publicly 
stated that President Clinton sexually assaulted her, voted for him in the 1996 
Presidential election. Knowingly voting for a person whom you believe has at-
tempted to take advantage of you might appear to be irrational and wrong. 
However, no government official judges a person's vote and determines whether 
it is in his or her best interest. 
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may lead to violence,237 and we protect freedom of religion even 
though some will join cults.238 
Thus, even when courts disagree with the manner in which 
people exercise some of their most valuable rights, and view the ex-
ercise as harmful, the courts do not limit the individual's ability to 
make these choices. Nor do courts withhold a meaningful remedy 
from persons denied these rights. Part of an individual's autonomy 
interest is the ability to make what, with twenty-twenty hindsight, 
proves to be a poor, or even wrong, decision.239 Obviously, the con-
sequences of making an incorrect choice with regard to the right to 
refuse medical treatment are tremendous. A necessary incident of 
freedom and individual liberty, however, is permitting individuals 
to make mistakes, even life and death mistakes. 
2. Applying tort principles 
Application of basic tort principles to remedy a violation of the 
right to refuse medical treatment is straightforward if one respects 
the autonomy interests at stake. A battery action for unauthorized 
medical treatment has existed for many years. The Cruzan Court 
noted its potential availability as a remedy for violation of a pa-
tient's right to refuse medical treatment.240 A physician who know-
ingly ignores a patient's advance directive would be liable for bat-
tery and should be subject to damages for the harm caused by the 
wrongful resuscitation or failure to obey the patient's desire for 
treatment to be withdrawn.241 Depending on the jurisdiction, the 
237. See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., MAss POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSS-
NATIONAL CAUSAL ANALYSIS 8 (1973) (commenting that unpopular political 
speeches have caused riots in which people have died); WILLIAM W. VAN 
ALsTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 34-35, 107 n.38 (1984) 
(citing several Supreme Court political speech cases to support the theory that 
extreme and offensive speech is valuable because of its ability to grab attention 
and force debate on difficult issues). 
238. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (setting forth the 
general test to be applied in First Amendment free exercise challenges). See 
generally, Leon Wieseltier, Strait Was the Gate, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21, 1997, 
at 42 (discussing the Heaven's Gate cult and the death of its members who be-
lieved that they would find their maker on a comet). 
239. See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 222. Although the contribution that 
autonomy gives to the value of a person's life is undisputed, it is a separate 
question whether that value is enhanced by a liberty interest to make immoral 
or wrong choices. Joseph Raz argues forcefully that in many cases it is not. 
JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 380-81, 410-12 (1986). 
240. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) 
(discussing the common law view that a physician's nonconsensual touching 
may constitute a battery). 
241. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., No. C-930819, 1995 WL 
109128, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1995), rev'd, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996). 
This holding was reversed on appeal because of a failure to show any connec-
tion between the defibrillation and Winter's subsequent stroke. See Anderson, 
671 N.E.2d at 228; see also Marcus L. Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Con-
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plaintiff may have to show that she has suffered harm to recover 
compensatory damages,242 but should be entitled to nominal dam-
ages and even punitive damages without such proof.243 Some juris-
dictions will presume harm and award damages even though no 
physical harm has been shown.244 Under either analysis, the dam-
ages resulting from battery when a patient specifically has asked 
not to be resuscitated should include all future medical expenses: If 
the patient had not been resuscitated, she would not be alive to in-
cur these expenses.245 Even if no evidence exists that the resuscita-
tion caused the subsequent medical problems, by definition, those 
problems can be said to have resulted from the health care pro-
vider's actions. In addition, the plaintiff should be permitted to re-
cover for any costs related to end-of-life care, emotional damages 
(including the deprivation of the right to make a refusal of treat-
ment choice and the pain and suffering of the current illness), and 
perhaps even the continued anguish and indignity of remaining 
alive but grossly impaired without hope ofrecovery.246 
sent", 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 666 (1968) (stating that in order to recover 
damages the plaintiff only need show that what was done was substantially dif-
ferent from that to which consent was given); Leonard L. Riskin, Informed Con-
sent: Looking For the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L. FORUM 580, 583-84 (stating that in 
medical informed consent cases, the "plaintiff may recover damages for the 
wrongful touching, for all injuries flowing from the touching, and if the court or 
jury considers it appropriate, for punitive damages"). 
242. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAw OF REMEDIES, § 7.3(2), at 305 (2d ed. 
1993) (discussing torts, such as battery, and noting that some jurisdictions 
permit recovery of presumed damages in situations where one of these torts has 
been committed but little or no economic or physical harm results); see, e.g., 
Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 716,724 CWo Va. 1959) ("[D]amage flows 
from the wrongful act, itself injurious to another's rights, although no percepti-
ble loss or harm accrues therefrom .... "). 
243. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 242, § 7.3(2), at 305 (discussing that some ju-
risdictions do not use the presumed damages rule and, thus, may leave the 
plaintiff without a substantial recovery, but that these jurisdictions generally 
will emphasize other immeasurable damages, such as emotional distress or pu-
nitive damages, to ensure a full recovery). 
244. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1977) (holding that 
students who were deprived of their procedural due process rights may collect 
nominal sums in the absence of proof of damages); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 
64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919) (noting that substantial damages are presumed in voting 
rights cases); Lamb v. Cartwright, 393 F. Supp. 1081, 1085 (E.D. Tex. 1975) 
(allowing recovery for unlawful arrest); Miles v. F.E.R.M. Enters., 627 P.2d 564, 
568 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that in a civil rights action for race dis-
crimination damages are presumed). 
245. To prove compensatory damages in a battery action, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that "but for" the defendant's tortious conduct, she would not have 
suffered the harm or offense. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 44, § 41, at 205. 
246. Likewise, if a health care provider negligently fails to respect a pa-
tient's right to refuse treatment, he or she should be held liable if the patient 
can prove the elements of a negligence cause of action. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 18, at 102 (4th ed. 1971) (stating 
that a doctor is liable if he acts without the consent of the patient or a court or-
der). In a negligence case, the analysis requires the identification of a duty and 
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Once courts accept that prolonging life against a person's 
wishes is a harm, proving damages should not be difficult. As noted 
above, in many jurisdictions, under either a battery or negligence 
cause of action, plaintiffs must provide proof of their injuries relat-
ing to harm allegedly caused by prolonging an individual's life 
against his or her will in order to receive compensation.247 This sys-
tem is imperfect like any system that attempts to compensate hu-
man injury with money.248 Some deserving plaintiffs may be denied 
recovery because they cannot prove that their harm is real. Other 
plaintiffs may be overcompensated in the imprecise process of at-
taching a monetary value to mental anguish and the loss of dignity. 
This proof of harm requirement should satisfy those who are wor-
ried about speculative damages and the potential harm to the medi-
cal profession from the risk of huge liability awards. Moreover, re-
quiring proof of damages or harm helps to weed out unmeritorious 
cases at an early stage. If the plaintiffs cannot plead specifically the 
type of harm they have suffered, they may have failed to state a 
cause of action and their suit should be dismissed.249 In addition, 
providing proof of injury provides appellate courts with a record 
against which they can independently evaluate the merits of any 
award.250 Rather than speculate about possible damages, or the lack 
breach of that duty, as well as proof of causation and damages. See Menifee v. 
Ohio Welding Prods., 472 N.E.2d 707,710 (Ohio 1984). 
A breach of duty arises when a health care provider negligently interferes 
with a person's right to refuse medical treatment. Consider first the factual 
scenario in Anderson where the nurse negligently failed to read the plaintiff's 
DNR order on his medical chart. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226. A reasonable 
person employed as a nurse should be familiar with a patient's chart; thus, the 
nurse has a duty to read the chart. Once the nurse should have known of the 
patient's wish to refuse life-sustaining treatment, the nurse's duty shifts to 
abide by the patient's wishes. Her negligence in resuscitating the plaintiff con-
stitutes a breach of that duty. 
Furthermore, causation and damages should not be complicated to assess. 
As Professor Oddi stated when describing a negligence cause of action for the 
right to refuse treatment, "the loss to the patient asserting the right to die is 
the prolongation oflife. Expressed in terms of causation, the question becomes: 
But for the. . . interference with the right to die, that is, the rendering of 
treatment, was the life of the patient prolonged?" Oddi, supra note 35, at 661. 
Thus, the measure of damages should be reflective of how long the life was 
prolonged after the time when death would be expected to occur had no treat-
ment been rendered. See id. See generally CHARLES T. McComnCK, HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES 260-74 (1935) (discussing the standard of proximate 
cause in torts). 
247. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
248. Cf. Friedman, supra note 22, at 741-42 (asserting that the familiar no-
tion that money can make someone whole is somewhat dubious where physical 
injuries are concerned). 
249. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 678-79 (E.D. Ark. 1998) 
(dismissing Paula Jones' sex discrimination and outrage claims for failure to 
show harm from alleged unwelcome sexual advances from the then-Governor of 
Arkansas). 
250. See Miller, supra note 15, at 189. 
HeinOnline -- 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1083 1998
1998] BEYOND MISGUIDED PATERNALISM 1083 
thereof, appellate courts will have proof of actual damages and thus 
be unable to impose their vie'VIloint of what damages should be 
awarded. 
Awarding financial damages in these cases would better bal-
ance the power relationship among the patient, family, and health 
care provider.251 In addition, in a traditional tort action for battery, 
plaintiffs are entitled to a trial by jury.252 The public abhorrence of 
such over-treatment of patients, and the widespread public fear of 
being kept alive against one's ,viti, are likely to make the possibility 
of trial by jury extremely unattractive to the medical profession.253 
Thus, in contrast to the current approach that denies a tort re-
covery for violations of the right to refuse medical treatment,254 
courts should apply basic tort principles ,vithout flinching at the 
fact that a person has chosen death over an undesirable existence. 
For example, in Estate of Leach v. Shapiro,255 the court held that 
Ms. Leach's estate could recover on the basis of a battery theory for 
her "'Tongful resuscitation.256 The court analogized the case to other 
battery cases and treated Ms. Leach's claim like all other medical 
batteries.257 
251. See Peters, supra note 195, at 693 (arguing that providing compensa-
tion to the plaintiff can ensure greater protection of the plaintiffs right to ref-
use treatment); Stephanie S. Gold, Note, An Equality Approach to Wrongful 
Birth Statutes, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1005, 1011 (1996) (noting that the denial of 
a patient's right to sue and collect damages for the wrongful birth tort relives 
the doctor from "the threat of liability and the corollary burden of full disclo-
sure"). 
252. See Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 35, at 270-71 (discussing the bene-
fits to the plaintiff of a trial by jury in a wrongful living cause of action). 
253. The recent acquittals of Jack Kevorkian demonstrate the public'S belief 
that the law does not reflect the importance of end-of-life decisions. In 1994 
and 1996, Michigan juries acquitted Jack Kevorkian for his participation in as-
sisted suicides of terminally ill individuals. See Kelly L. Anderson, Kevorkian 
Acquitted for the Second Time, AsSOCIATED PREss, Mar. 8, 1996, available in 
1996 WL 4415582 (discussing Kevorkian's second acquittal); David Margolick, 
Kevorkian's Trial Has Come to an End but Debate on Assisted Suicide Hasn't, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1994, at A16 (commenting that Jack Kevorkian was acquit-
ted by a Michigan jury of charges that he illegally assisted the suicides of ter-
minally ill individuals because jury members determined that he had not in-
tended the deaths but only that he intended to relive pain and suffering). 
254. See supra Part ILB. 
255. 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing potential of recovery 
for non-consensual administration of life-sustaining treatment). In Leach, Ms. 
Leach's estate sued after hospital personnel placed her on a respirator without 
her or her family's consent follo\ving an in-hospital resuscitation which resulted 
in her being left in a chronic vegetative state. [d. at 1052. In reversing the 
lower court's dismissal of the claim, the appellate court concluded that a pa-
tient may recover for violation of her right to refuse medial treatment. See id. 
256. Id. at 1052. 
257. See id. at 1052-53. Although the appellate court permitted Ms. Leach's 
estate to bring her claim, the trial court dismissed the patient's action for lack 
of sufficient evidence on the issue of informed consent and damages to her fam-
ily. See Akron Doctor Goes to Trial in 'Right to Die' Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
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Likewise, in Bouvia v. Superior Court/58 a case requesting only 
injunctive relief, the court properly noted the importance of the in-
dividual's autonomy interest.259 Ms. Bouvia suffered from cerebral 
palsy, quadriplegia, and arthritis.260 Although she was not termi-
nally ill and, in fact, doctors expected her to live for another fifteen 
to twenty years, her medical condition was not subject to cure and 
her physical ailments permanently and irreversibly impaired her 
ability to function.261 While at the hospital, Ms. Bouvia became so ill 
that she stopped eating because she could no longer swallow with-
out vomiting.262 No longer wishing to be in pain or be completely 
dependent on others for all bodily functions, the plaintiff executed a 
written instruction stating her unwillingness to undergo further 
medical treatment.263 Nonetheless, the hospital, concerned that her 
weight loss might reach life-threatening levels, intentionally placed 
her on life-sustaining treatment, inserting a feeding tube into Ms. 
Bouvia against her express written instructions.264 
The Bouvia court recognized her right to have the nasogastric 
tube withdrawn and prohibited its replacement on the basis of her 
right to refuse medical. treatment, even that which is life-
sustaining.265 The court reasoned that the decision concerning one's 
medical treatment belongs to each person.266 The court correctly 
stated: "It is not a medical decision for her physicians to make. Nei-
ther is it a legal question whose soundness is to be resolved by law-
yers or judges .... It is a moral and philosophical decision that, be-
ing a competent adult, is her's [sic] alone.,,267 
1985, at A17; Judge Clears Doctor Who Refused Death Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
19, 1985, at A24. 
258. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986). 
259. Id. at 301. 
260. See id. at 299-300. 
261. She was in constant pain, completely unable to care for herself in any 
manner, and was dependent upon someone for "feeding, washing, cleaning, 
toiIeting, turning, and helping her with elimination and other bodily functions." 
Id. at 300. 
262. See id. 
263. See id. at 300 n.2. 
264. See id. at 300. 
265. Id. 
266. See id. at 305. After winning the court's approval to have her feeding 
tube removed, Ms. Bouvia elected not to remove the tube and is presently still 
alive. See WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND ETHICS 586 (5th ed. 
1998). 
267. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305. The Bouvia court goes to great lengths 
to make sure that Ms. Bouvia's suffering is well-understood. Id. at 304 ("In 
Elizabeth Bouvia's view, the quality of her life has been diminished to the point 
of hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration. She, as the pa-
tient, lying helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her exis-
tence meaningless. She cannot be faulted for so concluding."). 
I agree that courts must be careful not to permit the refusal of medical 
treatment only when they agree \vith it. The decisions should turn on whether 
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Ms. Bouvia most likely would also have had a battery claim, as 
the hospital and doctors subjected her to intentional harmful con-
duct against her written wishes.268 Specifically, Ms. Bouvia had a 
right to refuse sustaining medical treatment. She had exercised 
this right and memorialized her election so that she would not have 
to endure pain, suffering, and loss of dignity. 269 When health care 
providers intentionally inserted a feeding tube into Ms. Bouvia's 
body ,vithout her consent, their intentional and nonconsensual 
touching caused a harmful condition that she had the right to pre-
vent.270 Thus, a patient in this situation could commence an action 
for battery and seek monetary damages for medical expenses from 
unwanted treatment. 
The approach provided in the Leach and Bouvia cases reflects 
respect for the rights of patient autonomy. A successful tort action 
results in a court ordering the defendant to pay a certain sum of 
money to the victim of his negligent or intentional wrongful conduct. 
This award both compensates the plaintiff for her damages and de-
ters the defendant and others from engaging in tortious behavior.271 
the patient was competent to make a decision, or has properly designated a 
surrogate to make a decision based on the individual's values and beliefs. 
Some commentators have asserted that the court permitted Ms. Bouvia to 
withdraw her life support only after concluding that her decision was rational 
and "correct." See generally Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Con-
sent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 281 (1977) (asserting that in 
situations where the court is looking to the reasonableness of the patient's deci-
sion, whether explicitly so or not, "if patients do not decide the 'wrong' way, the 
issue of competency will probably not arise"); Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choices: 
Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 103, 124 
(1996) (asserting that the recognition of a right to refuse medical treatment 
"that is based solely in concerns about the individual's liberty or autonomy 
would not require the court to discuss at length, as this court did, the dimin-
ished quality of Bouvia's life"). 
268. Section 13 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: "An actor is 
subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he acts intending to cause a 
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person ... , 
and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly re-
sults." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). A comment to the Re-
statement states: 
[A] surgeon who performs an operation upon a patient who has re-
fused to submit to it is not relieved from liability by the fact that he 
honestly and, indeed, justifiably believes that the operation is neces-
sary to save the patient's life. Indeed, the fact that medical testimony 
shows that the patient would have died had the operation not been 
performed and that the operation has effected a complete cure is not 
enough to relieve the physician from liability. 
Id. § 13 cmt. c. 
269. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300 & n.2. 
270. See id. at 300-01. From the moment that the feeding tube was in-
serted, Ms. Bouvia e"-"Perienced pain and a loss of dignity that she would not 
have endured had she been allowed to die. See id. at 299. 
271. See PROSSER, supra note 246, § 4, at 22-23. 
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Although permitting patients to recover in tort obviously ex-
poses health care providers to more potential risks, health care pro-
viders may still be able to assert affirmative defenses.272 Moreover, 
health care providers who act in good faith will have no reason to 
fear a battery or negligence claim because of the protections pro-
vided in living will and proxy statutes.273 This is certainly an im-
provement over the current approach that protects the rights of the 
health care provider, permitting the provider to err on the side of 
life when faced with a request to end life-prolonging treatment with 
which he or she disagrees.274 If courts applied this approach to vio-
lations of the right to refuse treatment, they would acknowledge the 
health care provider's duty not to treat without consent and allow 
the trial process to determine whether the duty was breached.275 
Thus, a damage award in these cases will act as a deterrent to 
health care providers. 
Recognition of patients' rights and corresponding physician du-
ties in this area should expand if courts apply tort principles in the 
conventional manner to right to refuse treatment cases. Unfortu-
nately, this may take a significant amount of time. As demon-
strated by the Anderson opinion, many years may pass before such 
claims routinely survive defendants' summary judgment motions.276 
Thus, some legislative modifications of the current law may be re-
. d 277 qUlre . 
272. Such affirmative defenses might include, for example, that the health 
care provider reasonably believed that the patient making the demand was in-
competent at the time, or that the decision was being made on behalf of an ad-
mittedly incompetent patient by some family members while other family 
members disagreed. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528, 
1533-34 (D. Colo. 1987). 
273. All state living will and health care proxy statutes confer some sort of 
immunity from civil and/or criminal liability to health care providers who in 
good faith comply with a properly executed living will or the instructions of a 
proxy acting in accordance ,vith the patient's ,vishes or in the patient's best in-
terest. See 2 MEISEL, supra note 7, § 11.17, at 111 n.102 (listing living will 
statutes); id. § 12.46, at 196 n.216 (listing proxy statutes). 
274. See supra Part II. 
275. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. c. (1965) (stating 
that providing a remedy for legal violations best serves the deterrence function 
of tort law). 
276. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 195, at 711-17 (arguing that the popularity 
of partial recovery for these actions may slow down the progress of providing a 
full remedy for these violations). 
277. A new legislative remedy may be required if courts continue to provide 
immunity to health care providers who ignore a patient's right to forego medi-
cal treatment. This can be accomplished through the modification of the cur-
rent advance directive statutes to include greater protection for the right to ref-
use treatment and providing specific guidance on damage awards for those who 
ignore this important right. By providing immunity from civil liability, the 
courts have given health care providers the power to override a patient's consti-
tutional right to refuse medical treatment. This result clearly undermines the 
purpose and goal of that right. 
HeinOnline -- 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1087 1998
1998] BEYOND MISGUIDED PATERNALISM 1087 
C. Responses to Those Who Think the Current Scheme Is Fine 
Some commentators argue that the courts should not adopt a 
new approach to right to refuse treatment damages actions.278 Even 
though courts have failed to grant plaintiffs complete relief for vio-
lations of their right to refuse treatment, the commentators claim 
that the partial recovery currently available through the tort law 
and the potential for professional licensing suspensions are suffi-
cient to protect an individual's right to refuse medical treatment.279 
They oppose the development of new remedies-either a wrongful-
living tort or new statutes-because, in their view, courts are not 
equipped to handle many of the questions posed by these situations 
(e.g., whether a patient should be permitted to choose death).280 
They also note that awarding damages would be antithetical to '''the 
very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has 
placed on human life, rather than its absence.",281 
Moreover, at least one commentator has expressed concern that 
any additional "[l]egal recognition that a disabled life is an injury 
would harm the interests of those most directly concerned, the 
handicapped.,,282 Professor Milani asserts that permitting persons 
Although legislative action can always speed up tort reform, generally it is 
necessary when the current legal system provides no remedy, or where the 
courts are reluctant to ez..1Jand the law to apply to new areas. Neither of these 
situations applies in the right to refuse treatment cases, so hope exists that 
courts will apply traditional tort remedies. 
278. See, e.g., Milani, supra note 97, at 230 (arguing that the current poten-
tial for recovery is sufficient for any violation of the right to refuse treatment); 
Jon L. Spargur, Jr., Note, First Health Care Corp. v. Rettinger: Are Living Wills 
Dead in North Carolina? 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 610-11 (1997) (arguing 
that recent court decisions that permit providers to err on the side of life when 
a request to end treatment appears ambiguous provide sufficient protection for 
patient autonomy); see also Geoffrey Disston Minott & Vincent Phillip Zurzolo, 
Comment, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 447, 458-
67 (1981) (arguing against the wrongful life tort for many of the same reasons 
that commentators oppose the wrongful living tort). 
279. See Milani, supra note 97, at 222-27 (asserting that plaintiffs should be 
permitted to bring tort claims but damages should be limited); Sparger, supra 
note 278, at 610-11 (arguing that a narrow interpretation of living ,vill reme-
dies provides sufficient awards). But see Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George 
Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio 1996) (awarding only nominal damages for a 
battery claim for the right to refuse treatment). Clearly, neither the current 
application of the tort law nor professional sanctions provide adequate compen-
sation to the plaintiff or deterrence to health care providers. 
280. See Milani, supra note 97, at 222; Peters, supra note 195, at 715-16. 
281. Milani, supra note 97, at 154 (quoting Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 
345, 348 (Nev. 1995». 
282. Id. at 218. Medical literature suggest that doctors often "estimate the 
quality of life of chronically ill persons to be poorer than patients themselves 
hold it to be and give this conclusion great weight in inferring, incorrectly, that 
such person would choose to forgo life-prolonging treatment." Steven H. Miles, 
Physicians and Their Patients' Suicides, 271 JAMA 1786, 1786 (1994); see also 
Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Do Physicians' Own Preferences for Life-
Sustaining Treatment Influence Their Perceptions of Patients' Preferences?, 4 J. 
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who are on life-sustaining treatment to sue their doctors provides 
an incentive for doctors not to treat the disabled283 and encourages a 
lack of respect for them.284 
These scholars focus on the potential for a partial remedy under 
the current system and argue that this is sufficient.285 However, as 
noted earlier, the case law demonstrates that the current scheme 
does not adequately protect the right to refuse treatment.2gS As An-
derson showed,287 the court may determine that causation is lacking 
or that no harm exists due to a simplistic, if not disingenuous, con-
ception of the legally cognizable injuries resulting from failure to re-
spect a patient's wishes.28B Moreover, Anderson permits only nomi-
nal damages for a violation of the right to refuse treatment.289 No 
incentive currently exists for health care providers to obey the pa-
tient's wishes.290 These scholars must acknowledge that often no 
CLINICAL ETHICS 28, 31 (1993) (suggesting that not only do physicians "often 
underestimate their patients' perceived quality oflife," but also that they may 
"be influenced by, their own personal preferences"). 
283. Milani, supra note 97, at 218. Medical doctors' perceptions about the 
quality of life of persons with disabilities may be overly negative. See David 
Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair Dis-
crimination Against the Sick, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 59-60 (1996) 
(suggesting that doctors, in determining whether a patient is eligible for treat-
ment, use the same costlbenefit analyses as do employers in determining 
whether to hire a disabled person); Marsha Saxton, Prenatal Screening and 
Discriminatory Attitudes About Disability, 13 WO:MEN & HEALTH 217,223 (1988) 
(''By working in hospitals, with sick people, doctors generally see only those 
cases of disability where there are complications, where patients are poorly 
managed, or patients in terminal stages. Many physicians never have the op-
portunity to see disabled individuals living independently, productively, en-
joyably."). 
284. Milani, supra note 97, at 218-19; see Carol J. Gill, Suicide Intervention 
for Persons with Disabilities: A Lesson in Inequality, 8 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 37, 
38-39 (1992) (asserting that when persons with disabilities say they want to 
die, it is treated as "natural" or "reasonable," while persons without disabilities 
expressing the same wish are labeled "suicidal"). 
285. See, e.g., Milani, supra note 97, at 223-27 (arguing that nominal dam-
ages and recovery for extraordinary medical expenses are an adequate remedy 
for a violation of the right to refuse medical treatment). 
286. See supra Part II. For example, in Ohio, offensive conduct only entitles 
the plaintiff to nominal damages. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George 
Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio 1996). Moreover, professional sanctions, 
which are rare, do not provide a mechanism to enforce a patient's decision and 
further do not provide monetary recovery for unwanted medical treatment. 
287. See supra notes 125-56 and accompanying text. 
288. Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229. 
289. Id. 
290. Living will and other advance directive statutes, as well as professional 
sanctions, fail to provide an appropriate remedy. See supra notes 113, 215-16; 
see also Rich, supra note 113, at 1172 n.230 (arguing that the legislation 
"serves only the interests of healthcare providers and the right to life move-
ment"). 
Under Ohio law, a physician cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution, 
professional disciplinary action, tort liability, or other civil action if the physi-
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remedy exists for violations of the right to refuse medical treatment. 
This lack of remedy fails to provide protection for one of our most 
important rights. 
One should also remember that in cases when defendant health 
care providers administer unwanted life-sustaining treatment, the 
nature of the intrusion and the corresponding harm to the auton-
omy interest can be significant. For example, in Bartling v. Glen-
dale Adventist Medical Center,291 health care providers placed a 
competent and extremely ill patient on a ventilator against his will, 
with a tube inserted in his throat via a tracheotomy.292 His hands 
were restrained to prevent him from pulling out the tube.293 For a 
competent but unwilling patient such as Mr. Bartling, that kind of 
treatment can only be described as a form of torture. He was kept 
in this state from April through November, 1984 when he died.294 
During the entire time he was in constant pain.295 The injustice in 
not allowing Mr. Bartling's estate to recover should be apparent to 
anyone who takes seriously the concept of informed consent and the 
right to refuse medical treatment. 
Moreover, the elderly and disabled should expect that doctors 
\vill respect their medical decisions, even if they do not agree with 
them.296 These patients are entitled to receive the same medical 
treatment as any other person. Health care providers should not 
refuse treatment to these patients because of high costs or because 
of a mistaken belief concerning the quality of life of the aged and 
disabled. Moreover, medical professionals who presume that an 
elderly or disabled person wants to die should be held liable, even 
criminally, if they fail to use their best efforts to keep that person 
alive. 
What appears to underlie the anxiety of these commentators is 
that the health care profession may not appreciate the quality of life 
cian acts in good faith, in reliance on a health care decision, and in compliance 
with a power of attorney statute. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.15(A) 
(Anderson 1953 & Supp. 1997). A physician or health care facility can also ref-
use to comply or allow compliance with the instructions of a directive on the ba-
sis of conscience or any other basis, as long as they transfer the individual to a 
physician or health care facility that ,vill comply with the directive. See id. § 
1337.16(B)(1)-(2)(a). In addition, under Ohio law, a physician or health care 
facility cannot be forced to provide or withhold health care to an individual 
during an emergency situation. See id. § 1337.16(C). 
These provisions make it difficult to determine under what circumstances 
a physician or health care facility could actually be held liable for acting con-
trary to an individual's wishes. The provisions may actually provide the physi-
cian or health care facility with excuses for acting or not acting. 
291. 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1986). 
292. ld. at 361. 
293. See id. 
294. See id. 
295. See id. at 362. 
296. For a discussion of the importance of personal autonomy and the right 
to refuse medical treatment, see supra Part 1. 
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that the aged and disabled lead.297 They fear that this misunder-
standing will be enhanced by large damage awards in right to ref-
use treatment cases.298 
The denial of a remedy, however, fails to address their concern. 
Rather, protection for elderly and disabled patients comes from the 
procedural mechanisms that guarantee the proper exercise of the 
right to refuse treatment.299 Saying that a doctor is legally empow-
ered or required to stop life support for someone who wants it 
stopped is no justification for allowing a doctor to stop life support 
for a disabled person who wants to live. The autonomy interest to 
choose life or death need not devalue life; rather, it should honor the 
choice for life just as much as, if not more than, it should honor the 
choice for death. The Cruzan case300 made clear that states may 
place a burden on the right to refuse treatment to ensure that un-
caring physicians or greedy relatives do not take advantage of the 
ill.301 However, the Cruzan Court recognized that some people 
would be denied the right to refuse treatment because they failed to 
assert it in compliance with the law.302 
Once someone has exercised the right to refuse medical treat-
ment, in accordance with the law, he or she should receive a remedy 
if a health care professional ignores his or her wishes. The per-
ceived lack of adequate safeguards in the process should not result 
in the denial of protection, i.e., a remedy, for all those who have law-
fully exercised their right. It is better to respect the right of people 
who have complied with the procedures by allowing a remedy, than 
to have a right that is meaningless because it is unenforceable. 
Doctors should not be permitted to displace the patient's exercise of 
the right to refuse treatment. Each person should be free to make 
his or her own decisions about the medical care that he or she re-
ceives at the end of life and should have his or her choices re-
spected. Protecting an individual's autonomy interest justifies the 
courts' process of learning to respect each individual's decision 
about the medical. care he or she wishes to receive, particularly with 
respect to life-sustaining care. As Dworkin has written, "[t]he 
297. See supra note 282. 
298. See supra text accompanying note 281. 
299. See Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1979) ("Judges have no monopoly on the task of giving meaning to the public 
values of the Constitution, but neither is there reason for them to be silent."); 
see also Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the En-
forcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HAsTINGS L.J. 665, 681-82 (1987) 
(urging the establishment of a new framework for enforcing rights in the fed-
eral courts). 
300. See supra Part LA. 
301. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281-83 (1990). 
302. Id. at 284. See generally Friedman, supra note 22, at 777-80 
(discussing the importance of the courts in setting forth and enforcing the rem-
edy for violations of individual liberties). 
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greatest insult to the sanctity of life is indifference or laziness in the 
face of its complexity.'>3OJ 
CONCLUSION 
Advances in medical technology have drastically changed the 
way physicians treat patients, affecting how, where, and when 
Americans die. Many people expire only after being subject to he-
roic life-sustaining measures unheard of a few decades ago. In re-
sponse to this medical development, courts and legislatures recog-
nized the "right to die," stating that patients have a constitutional 
or common law interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. 304 
Despite these attempts to secure the individual's right to refuse 
medical treatment, the case law indicates that physicians routinely 
ignore advance directives from patients.305 Obviously, one impor-
tant reason for this is the fact that physicians and other health care 
providers are almost immune from legal sanctions. 
The fundamental obstacle to full implementation of the right to 
refuse medical treatment is not the failure to recognize the right, 
but the unwillingness of courts to remedy the violation of the right 
by physicians.306 This should not be the case. Federal and state law 
expressly recognize the right to refuse medical treatment. If the 
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is to have meaning, the law 
must provide a remedy for intentional or negligent violations of this 
right. 
For understandable reasons, courts show a deep reluctance to 
assess civil liability against health care providers who choose to 
preserve life.307 The courts have not fully explored the fundamental 
interests involved and have been one-sided in analyzing important 
constitutional issues. The moral complexity of the issue, however, 
does not excuse courts from their duty to enforce this fundamental 
right. 
303. DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 240. 
304. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying te}..i;. 
305. See supra Part I.C. 
306. See supra Part II. 
307. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. 
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